This file is available on a Cryptome DVD offered by Cryptome. Donate $25 for a DVD of the Cryptome 10+-years archives of 37,000 files from June 1996 to December 2006 (~3.7 GB). Click Paypal or mail check/MO made out to John Young, 251 West 89th Street, New York, NY 10024. Archives include all files of cryptome.org, cryptome2.org, jya.com, cartome.org, eyeball-series.org and iraq-kill-maim.org. Cryptome offers with the Cryptome DVD an INSCOM DVD of about 18,000 pages of counter-intelligence dossiers declassified by the US Army Information and Security Command, dating from 1945 to 1985. No additional contribution required -- $25 for both. The DVDs will be sent anywhere worldwide without extra cost.

6 December 2006

http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html

[Converted from PDF]

The Iraq Study Group Report





T h e I r a q 

Study Group 

Report 

James A. Baker, III, and 

Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs 

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, 

Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, 

William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, 

Alan K. Simpson 

vintage books 

A Division of Random House, Inc. 

New York





FIRST VINTAGE BOOKS EDITION: DECEMBER 2006 

All rights reserved. 

The Authorized Edition of The Iraq Study Group Report is published in the 

United States by Vintage Books, a division of Random House, Inc., New York, 

and in Canada by Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto. 

Maps © 2006 by Joyce Pendola 

Vintage and colophon are registered trademarks of Random House, Inc. 

ISBN: 0-307-38656-2 

ISBN-13: 978-0-307-38656-4 

www.vintagebooks.com 

A portion of the proceeds from the purchase of this book will be donated to the 

National Military Family Association, the only nonprofit organization that represents 

the families of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, 

and the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service and the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, prepares spouses, children, and parents 

to better deal with the unique challenges of military life. The Association 

protects benefits vital to all families, including those of the deployed, wounded, 

and fallen. For more than 35 years, its staff and volunteers, comprised mostly of 

military family members, have built a reputation as the leading experts on military 

family issues. For more information, visit www.nmfa.org. 

Printed in the United States of America 

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 

First Edition





Contents 

Letter from the Co-Chairs ix 

Executive Summary xiii 

I. Assessment 

A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq 3 

1. Security 3 

2. Politics 12 

3. Economics 22 

4. International Support 27 

5. Conclusions 32 

B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq 33 

C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq 37 

1. Precipitate Withdrawal 37 

2. Staying the Course 38 

v





3. More Troops for Iraq 38 

4. Devolution to Three Regions 39 

D. Achieving Our Goals 40 

II. The Way Forward—A New Approach 

A. The External Approach: Building an 

International Consensus 43 

1. The New Diplomatic Offensive 44 

2. The Iraq International Support Group 46 

3. Dealing with Iran and Syria 50 

4. The Wider Regional Context 54 

B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help 

Themselves 59 

1. Performance on Milestones 59 

2. National Reconciliation 64 

3. Security and Military Forces 70 

4. Police and Criminal Justice 78 

5. The Oil Sector 83 

6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction 

Assistance 86 

7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, 

and Review 90 

8. U.S. Personnel 92 

9. Intelligence 93 

vi 

Contents





Appendices 

Overview Map of the Region 99 

Overview Map of Iraq 100 

Administrative Divisions 101 

Distribution of Religious Groups 102 

Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations 103 

Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions 106 

Iraq Study Group Consultations 107 

Expert Working Groups and Military 

Senior Advisor Panel 117 

The Iraq Study Group 124 

Iraq Study Group Support 142 

vii 

Contents









Letter from the Co-Chairs 

There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, 

there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation 

and protect American interests. 

Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation 

in Iraq but with the state of our political debate regarding 

Iraq. Our political leaders must build a bipartisan approach to 

bring a responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and 

costly war. Our country deserves a debate that prizes substance 

over rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. 

The President and Congress must work together. Our 

leaders must be candid and forthright with the American people 

in order to win their support. 

No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at 

this point will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a 

slide toward chaos. If current trends continue, the potential 

consequences are severe. Because of the role and responsibility 

of the United States in Iraq, and the commitments our government 

has made, the United States has special obligations. 

Our country must address as best it can Iraq’s many problems. 

ix





The United States has long-term relationships and interests at 

stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged. 

In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq 

Study Group present a new approach because we believe there 

is a better way forward. All options have not been exhausted. 

We believe it is still possible to pursue different policies that 

can give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, 

stabilize a critical region of the world, and protect America’s 

credibility, interests, and values. Our report makes it clear 

that the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people also must act to 

achieve a stable and hopeful future. 

What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous 

amount of political will and cooperation by the executive 

and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It 

demands skillful implementation. It demands unity of effort by 

government agencies. And its success depends on the unity of 

the American people in a time of political polarization. Americans 

can and must enjoy the right of robust debate within a 

democracy. Yet U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure—as is 

any course of action in Iraq—if it is not supported by a broad, 

sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our 

country toward such a consensus. 

We want to thank all those we have interviewed and those who 

have contributed information and assisted the Study Group, 

both inside and outside the U.S. government, in Iraq, and 

around the world. We thank the members of the expert working 

groups, and staff from the sponsoring organizations. We especially 

thank our colleagues on the Study Group, who have 

worked with us on these difficult issues in a spirit of generosity 

and bipartisanship. 

x 

L e t t e r f r o m t h e C o - C h a i r s





In presenting our report to the President, Congress, and 

the American people, we dedicate it to the men and women— 

military and civilian—who have served and are serving in Iraq, 

and to their families back home. They have demonstrated extraordinary 

courage and made difficult sacrifices. Every American 

is indebted to them. 

We also honor the many Iraqis who have sacrificed on behalf 

of their country, and the members of the Coalition Forces 

who have stood with us and with the people of Iraq. 

James A. Baker, III Lee H. Hamilton 

xi 

L e t t e r f r o m t h e C o - C h a i r s









Executive Summary 

The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no 

path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved. 

In this report, we make a number of recommendations 

for actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region. 

Our most important recommendations call for new and 

enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, 

and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq 

that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat 

forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations 

are equally important and reinforce one another. 

If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government 

moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an 

opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, 

stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and 

America’s credibility, interests, and values will be protected. 

The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing 

in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite 

militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality. 

Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability. 

xiii





The Iraqi people have a democratically elected government, yet 

it is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing 

basic security, or delivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive. 

If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences 

could be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse 

of Iraq’s government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring 

countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could 

spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand 

its base of operations. The global standing of the United States 

could be diminished. Americans could become more polarized. 

During the past nine months we have considered a full 

range of approaches for moving forward. All have flaws. Our 

recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly believe 

that it includes the best strategies and tactics to positively influence 

the outcome in Iraq and the region. 

External Approach 

The policies and actions of Iraq’s neighbors greatly affect its 

stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in 

the long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are not 

doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting 

stability. 

The United States should immediately launch a new 

diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability 

in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic effort should include 

every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic 

Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors. Iraq’s neighbors and key 

states in and outside the region should form a support group to 

reinforce security and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither 

of which Iraq can achieve on its own. 

xiv 

Executive Summary





Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events 

within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the 

United States should try to engage them constructively. In 

seeking to influence the behavior of both countries, the United 

States has disincentives and incentives available. Iran should 

stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq’s sovereignty 

and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi 

Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. The issue of 

Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the 

five permanent members of the United Nations Security 

Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with 

Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in 

and out of Iraq. 

The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle 

East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and 

regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained 

commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab- 

Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s 

June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and 

Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by, 

and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept 

Israel’s right to exist), and Syria. 

As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq 

and the Middle East, the United States should provide additional 

political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, 

including resources that might become available as combat 

forces are moved out of Iraq. 

Internal Approach 

The most important questions about Iraq’s future are now the 

responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role 

xv 

Executive Summary





in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their 

own destiny. 

The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility 

for Iraqi security by increasing the number and 

quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way, 

and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase 

the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat 

troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As 

these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move 

out of Iraq. 

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve 

to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary 

responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter 

of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security 

situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for 

force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat 

forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with 

Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, 

and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and 

search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. 

A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations 

forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in 

Iraq. 

It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance 

from the United States for some time to come, especially in 

carrying out security responsibilities. Yet the United States 

must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United 

States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, 

even if the Iraqi government did not implement their 

planned changes. The United States must not make an openended 

commitment to keep large numbers of American troops 

deployed in Iraq. 

xvi 

Executive Summary





As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize 

training and education of forces that have returned to 

the United States in order to restore the force to full combat 

capability. As equipment returns to the United States, Congress 

should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment 

over the next five years. 

The United States should work closely with Iraq’s leaders 

to support the achievement of specific objectives—or milestones—

on national reconciliation, security, and governance. 

Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the 

right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government 

needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens of the United 

States and other countries—that it deserves continued support. 

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the 

United States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for 

Iraq. His list is a good start, but it must be expanded to include 

milestones that can strengthen the government and benefit the 

Iraqi people. President Bush and his national security team 

should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi 

leadership to convey a clear message: there must be prompt action 

by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward 

the achievement of these milestones. 

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and 

makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones 

on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the 

United States should make clear its willingness to continue 

training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to 

continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi 

government does not make substantial progress toward the 

achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, 

and governance, the United States should reduce its political, 

military, or economic support for the Iraqi government. 

xvii 

Executive Summary





Our report makes recommendations in several other areas. 

They include improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system, 

the Iraqi oil sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq, 

the U.S. budget process, the training of U.S. government personnel, 

and U.S. intelligence capabilities. 

Conclusion 

It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these 

recommendations offer a new way forward for the United 

States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and 

need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should 

not be separated or carried out in isolation. The dynamics of 

the region are as important to Iraq as events within Iraq. 

The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days 

ahead. But by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region, 

and the United States of America can emerge stronger. 

xviii 

Executive Summary





I 

Assessment 

There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in 

Baghdad and several provinces is dire. Saddam Hussein has 

been removed from power and the Iraqi people have a democratically 

elected government that is broadly representative of 

Iraq’s population, yet the government is not adequately advancing 

national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering 

essential services. The level of violence is high and 

growing. There is great suffering, and the daily lives of many 

Iraqis show little or no improvement. Pessimism is pervasive. 

U.S. military and civilian personnel, and our coalition 

partners, are making exceptional and dedicated efforts—and 

sacrifices—to help Iraq. Many Iraqis have also made extraordinary 

efforts and sacrifices for a better future. However, the 

ability of the United States to influence events within Iraq is diminishing. 

Many Iraqis are embracing sectarian identities. The 

lack of security impedes economic development. Most countries 

in the region are not playing a constructive role in support 

of Iraq, and some are undercutting stability. 

Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability, and is 

critical to U.S. interests. It runs along the sectarian fault lines of





Shia and Sunni Islam, and of Kurdish and Arab populations. It 

has the world’s second-largest known oil reserves. It is now a 

base of operations for international terrorism, including al 

Qaeda. 

Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing 

how the United States is viewed in the region and around 

the world. Because of the gravity of Iraq’s condition and the 

country’s vital importance, the United States is facing one of its 

most difficult and significant international challenges in 

decades. Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by 

American decisions and actions, the United States has both a 

national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis 

an opportunity to avert anarchy. 

An assessment of the security, political, economic, and regional 

situation follows (all figures current as of publication), 

along with an assessment of the consequences if Iraq continues 

to deteriorate, and an analysis of some possible courses of 

action. 

2 

t h e i r aq study group report





A. Assessment of the Current 

Situation in Iraq 

1. Security 

Attacks against U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi security forces are persistent 

and growing. October 2006 was the deadliest month for 

U.S. forces since January 2005, with 102 Americans killed. Total 

attacks in October 2006 averaged 180 per day, up from 70 per 

day in January 2006. Daily attacks against Iraqi security forces in 

October were more than double the level in January. Attacks 

against civilians in October were four times higher than in January. 

Some 3,000 Iraqi civilians are killed every month. 

Sources of Violence 

Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality. There 

are multiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni Arab insurgency, 

al Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias 

and death squads, and organized criminality. Sectarian violence—

particularly in and around Baghdad—has become the 

principal challenge to stability. 

Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni 

Arab insurgency. The insurgency comprises former elements 

of the Saddam Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, 

3





and common criminals. It has significant support within the 

Sunni Arab community. The insurgency has no single leadership 

but is a network of networks. It benefits from participants’ 

detailed knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure, and arms and fi- 

nancing are supplied primarily from within Iraq. The insurgents 

have different goals, although nearly all oppose the 

presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. Most wish to restore Sunni 

Arab rule in the country. Some aim at winning local power and 

control. 

Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence 

in Iraq, but that includes some of the more spectacular acts: 

suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks on significant 

religious or political targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely 

Iraqi-run and composed of Sunni Arabs. Foreign fighters— 

numbering an estimated 1,300—play a supporting role or carry 

out suicide operations. Al Qaeda’s goals include instigating a 

wider sectarian war between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia, and driving 

the United States out of Iraq. 

Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi 

civilian casualties. Iraq is in the grip of a deadly cycle: Sunni insurgent 

attacks spark large-scale Shia reprisals, and vice versa. 

Groups of Iraqis are often found bound and executed, their 

bodies dumped in rivers or fields. The perception of unchecked 

violence emboldens militias, shakes confidence in the 

government, and leads Iraqis to flee to places where their sect 

is the majority and where they feel they are in less danger. In 

some parts of Iraq—notably in Baghdad—sectarian cleansing 

is taking place. The United Nations estimates that 1.6 million 

are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 million Iraqis have fled 

the country. 

Shiite militias engaging in sectarian violence pose a substantial 

threat to immediate and long-term stability. These mili- 

4 

t h e i r aq study group report





tias are diverse. Some are affiliated with the government, some 

are highly localized, and some are wholly outside the law. They 

are fragmenting, with an increasing breakdown in command 

structure. The militias target Sunni Arab civilians, and some 

struggle for power in clashes with one another. Some even target 

government ministries. They undermine the authority of 

the Iraqi government and security forces, as well as the ability 

of Sunnis to join a peaceful political process. The prevalence of 

militias sends a powerful message: political leaders can preserve 

and expand their power only if backed by armed force. 

The Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, may number 

as many as 60,000 fighters. It has directly challenged U.S. and 

Iraqi government forces, and it is widely believed to engage in 

regular violence against Sunni Arab civilians. Mahdi fighters 

patrol certain Shia enclaves, notably northeast Baghdad’s teeming 

neighborhood of 2.5 million known as “Sadr City.” As the 

Mahdi Army has grown in size and influence, some elements 

have moved beyond Sadr’s control. 

The Badr Brigade is affiliated with the Supreme Council 

for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which is led by 

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. The Badr Brigade has long-standing ties 

with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Many Badr members 

have become integrated into the Iraqi police, and others 

play policing roles in southern Iraqi cities. While wearing the 

uniform of the security services, Badr fighters have targeted 

Sunni Arab civilians. Badr fighters have also clashed with the 

Mahdi Army, particularly in southern Iraq. 

Criminality also makes daily life unbearable for many 

Iraqis. Robberies, kidnappings, and murder are commonplace 

in much of the country. Organized criminal rackets thrive, particularly 

in unstable areas like Anbar province. Some criminal 

gangs cooperate with, finance, or purport to be part of the 

5 

A s s e s s m e n t





Sunni insurgency or a Shiite militia in order to gain legitimacy. 

As one knowledgeable American official put it, “If there were 

foreign forces in New Jersey, Tony Soprano would be an insurgent 

leader.” 

Four of Iraq’s eighteen provinces are highly insecure— 

Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. These provinces account 

for about 40 percent of Iraq’s population of 26 million. In 

Baghdad, the violence is largely between Sunni and Shia. In 

Anbar, the violence is attributable to the Sunni insurgency and 

to al Qaeda, and the situation is deteriorating. 

In Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and 

Turkmen. In Basra and the south, the violence is largely an 

intra-Shia power struggle. The most stable parts of the country 

are the three provinces of the Kurdish north and parts of the 

Shia south. However, most of Iraq’s cities have a sectarian mix 

and are plagued by persistent violence. 

U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi Forces 

Confronting this violence are the Multi-National Forces–Iraq 

under U.S. command, working in concert with Iraq’s security 

forces. The Multi-National Forces–Iraq were authorized by 

UN Security Council Resolution 1546 in 2004, and the mandate 

was extended in November 2006 for another year. 

Approximately 141,000 U.S. military personnel are serving 

in Iraq, together with approximately 16,500 military personnel 

from twenty-seven coalition partners, the largest contingent 

being 7,200 from the United Kingdom. The U.S. Army has 

principal responsibility for Baghdad and the north. The U.S. 

Marine Corps takes the lead in Anbar province. The United 

Kingdom has responsibility in the southeast, chiefly in Basra. 

Along with this military presence, the United States is 

6 

t h e i r aq study group report





building its largest embassy in Baghdad. The current U.S. embassy 

in Baghdad totals about 1,000 U.S. government employees. 

There are roughly 5,000 civilian contractors in the country. 

Currently, the U.S. military rarely engages in large-scale 

combat operations. Instead, counterinsurgency efforts focus 

on a strategy of “clear, hold, and build”—“clearing” areas of 

insurgents and death squads, “holding” those areas with Iraqi 

security forces, and “building” areas with quick-impact reconstruction 

projects. 

Nearly every U.S. Army and Marine combat unit, and 

several National Guard and Reserve units, have been to Iraq at 

least once. Many are on their second or even third rotations; 

rotations are typically one year for Army units, seven months 

for Marine units. Regular rotations, in and out of Iraq or within 

the country, complicate brigade and battalion efforts to get to 

know the local scene, earn the trust of the population, and 

build a sense of cooperation. 

Many military units are under significant strain. Because 

the harsh conditions in Iraq are wearing out equipment more 

quickly than anticipated, many units do not have fully functional 

equipment for training when they redeploy to the United 

States. An extraordinary amount of sacrifice has been asked of 

our men and women in uniform, and of their families. The 

American military has little reserve force to call on if it needs 

ground forces to respond to other crises around the world. 

A primary mission of U.S. military strategy in Iraq is the 

training of competent Iraqi security forces. By the end of 2006, 

the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq under 

American leadership is expected to have trained and equipped 

a target number of approximately 326,000 Iraqi security services. 

That figure includes 138,000 members of the Iraqi Army 

and 188,000 Iraqi police. Iraqis have operational control over 

7 

A s s e s s m e n t





roughly one-third of Iraqi security forces; the U.S. has operational 

control over most of the rest. No U.S. forces are under 

Iraqi command. 

The Iraqi Army 

The Iraqi Army is making fitful progress toward becoming a reliable 

and disciplined fighting force loyal to the national government. 

By the end of 2006, the Iraqi Army is expected to 

comprise 118 battalions formed into 36 brigades under the 

command of 10 divisions. Although the Army is one of the 

more professional Iraqi institutions, its performance has been 

uneven. The training numbers are impressive, but they represent 

only part of the story. 

Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition 

and loyalties of some Iraqi units—specifically, whether 

they will carry out missions on behalf of national goals instead 

of a sectarian agenda. Of Iraq’s 10 planned divisions, those that 

are even-numbered are made up of Iraqis who signed up to 

serve in a specific area, and they have been reluctant to redeploy 

to other areas of the country. As a result, elements of the 

Army have refused to carry out missions. 

The Iraqi Army is also confronted by several other signifi- 

cant challenges: 

• Units lack leadership. They lack the ability to work together 

and perform at higher levels of organization—the brigade and 

division level. Leadership training and the experience of leadership 

are the essential elements to improve performance. 

• Units lack equipment. They cannot carry out their missions 

without adequate equipment. Congress has been generous 

8 

t h e i r aq study group report





in funding requests for U.S. troops, but it has resisted fully 

funding Iraqi forces. The entire appropriation for Iraqi defense 

forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion) is less than the United 

States currently spends in Iraq every two weeks. 

• Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a 

month so that they can visit their families and take them 

their pay. Soldiers are paid in cash because there is no banking 

system. Soldiers are given leave liberally and face no 

penalties for absence without leave. Unit readiness rates are 

low, often at 50 percent or less. 

• Units lack logistics and support. They lack the ability to sustain 

their operations, the capability to transport supplies and 

troops, and the capacity to provide their own indirect fire 

support, close-air support, technical intelligence, and medical 

evacuation. They will depend on the United States for 

logistics and support through at least 2007. 

The Iraqi Police 

The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that 

of the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Police Service currently numbers 

roughly 135,000 and is responsible for local policing. It has 

neither the training nor legal authority to conduct criminal 

investigations, nor the firepower to take on organized crime, 

insurgents, or militias. The Iraqi National Police numbers 

roughly 25,000 and its officers have been trained in counterinsurgency 

operations, not police work. The Border Enforcement 

Department numbers roughly 28,000. 

Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage 

in sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention, 

9 

A s s e s s m e n t





torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The police 

are organized under the Ministry of the Interior, which is 

confronted by corruption and militia infiltration and lacks control 

over police in the provinces. 

The United States and the Iraqi government recognize 

the importance of reform. The current Minister of the Interior 

has called for purging militia members and criminals from the 

police. But he has little police experience or base of support. 

There is no clear Iraqi or U.S. agreement on the character and 

mission of the police. U.S. authorities do not know with precision 

the composition and membership of the various police 

forces, nor the disposition of their funds and equipment. There 

are ample reports of Iraqi police officers participating in training 

in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for 

use in sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll but don’t 

show up for work. In the words of a senior American general, 

“2006 was supposed to be ‘the year of the police’ but it hasn’t 

materialized that way.” 

Facilities Protection Services 

The Facilities Protection Service poses additional problems. 

Each Iraqi ministry has an armed unit, ostensibly to guard the 

ministry’s infrastructure. All together, these units total roughly 

145,000 uniformed Iraqis under arms. However, these units 

have questionable loyalties and capabilities. In the ministries of 

Health, Agriculture, and Transportation—controlled by Moqtada 

al-Sadr—the Facilities Protection Service is a source of 

funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army. One senior U.S. official 

described the Facilities Protection Service as “incompetent, 

dysfunctional, or subversive.” Several Iraqis simply referred to 

them as militias. 

10 

t h e i r aq study group report





The Iraqi government has begun to bring the Facilities 

Protection Service under the control of the Interior Ministry. 

The intention is to identify and register Facilities Protection 

personnel, standardize their treatment, and provide some 

training. Though the approach is reasonable, this effort may exceed 

the current capability of the Interior Ministry. 

11 

A s s e s s m e n t 

Operation Together Forward II 

In a major effort to quell the violence in Iraq, U.S. military 

forces joined with Iraqi forces to establish security in 

Baghdad with an operation called “Operation Together 

Forward II,” which began in August 2006. Under Operation 

Together Forward II, U.S. forces are working with 

members of the Iraqi Army and police to “clear, hold, and 

build” in Baghdad, moving neighborhood by neighborhood. 

There are roughly 15,000 U.S. troops in Baghdad. 

This operation—and the security of Baghdad—is 

crucial to security in Iraq more generally. A capital city of 

more than 6 million, Baghdad contains some 25 percent 

of the country’s population. It is the largest Sunni and 

Shia city in Iraq. It has high concentrations of both Sunni 

insurgents and Shiite militias. Both Iraqi and American 

leaders told us that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq. 

The results of Operation Together Forward II are 

disheartening. Violence in Baghdad—already at high levels—

jumped more than 43 percent between the summer 

and October 2006. U.S. forces continue to suffer high casualties. 

Perpetrators of violence leave neighborhoods in 

advance of security sweeps, only to filter back later. Iraqi





2. Politics 

Iraq is a sovereign state with a democratically elected Council 

of Representatives. A government of national unity was formed 

in May 2006 that is broadly representative of the Iraqi people. 

Iraq has ratified a constitution, and—per agreement with 

Sunni Arab leaders—has initiated a process of review to determine 

if the constitution needs amendment. 

The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, 

and key players within the government too often act in 

their sectarian interest. Iraq’s Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders 

frequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq’s 

12 

t h e i r aq study group report 

police have been unable or unwilling to stop such infiltration 

and continuing violence. The Iraqi Army has provided 

only two out of the six battalions that it promised in 

August would join American forces in Baghdad. The Iraqi 

government has rejected sustained security operations in 

Sadr City. 

Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both 

the capability to hold areas that have been cleared and 

the will to clear neighborhoods that are home to Shiite 

militias. U.S. forces can “clear” any neighborhood, but 

there are neither enough U.S. troops present nor enough 

support from Iraqi security forces to “hold” neighborhoods 

so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq. 

Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. and 

Iraqi military forces are fundamentally changing the conditions 

encouraging the sectarian violence, U.S. forces 

seem to be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end.





national interest, and too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity 

to govern effectively. The result is an even weaker central 

government than the constitution provides. 

There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international 

agreement on the key issues confronting the Iraqi government: 

national reconciliation, including the negotiation of a “political 

deal” among Iraq’s sectarian groups on Constitution review, de- 

Baathification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, the future 

of Kirkuk, and amnesty; security, particularly curbing 

militias and reducing the violence in Baghdad; and governance, 

including the provision of basic services and the rollback of 

pervasive corruption. Because Iraqi leaders view issues through 

a sectarian prism, we will summarize the differing perspectives 

of Iraq’s main sectarian groups. 

Sectarian Viewpoints 

The Shia, the majority of Iraq’s population, have gained power 

for the first time in more than 1,300 years. Above all, many Shia 

are interested in preserving that power. However, fissures have 

emerged within the broad Shia coalition, known as the United 

Iraqi Alliance. Shia factions are struggling for power—over regions, 

ministries, and Iraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding 

together a broad and fractious coalition have led several 

observers in Baghdad to comment that Shia leaders are held 

“hostage to extremes.” Within the coalition as a whole, there is 

a reluctance to reach a political accommodation with the Sunnis 

or to disarm Shiite militias. 

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has demonstrated an understanding 

of the key issues facing Iraq, notably the need for 

national reconciliation and security in Baghdad. Yet strains 

have emerged between Maliki’s government and the United 

13 

A s s e s s m e n t





States. Maliki has publicly rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve 

certain benchmarks, ordered the removal of blockades around 

Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi security forces, and 

resisted U.S. requests to move forward on reconciliation or on 

disbanding Shiite militias. 

14 

t h e i r aq study group report 

Sistani, Sadr, Hakim 

The U.S. deals primarily with the Iraqi government, but 

the most powerful Shia figures in Iraq do not hold national 

office. Of the following three vital power brokers in 

the Shia community, the United States is unable to talk 

directly with one (Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani) and 

does not talk to another (Moqtada al-Sadr). 

grand ayatollah ali al-sistani: Sistani is the leading 

Shiite cleric in Iraq. Despite staying out of day-to-day 

politics, he has been the most influential leader in the 

country: all major Shia leaders have sought his approval 

or guidance. Sistani has encouraged a unified Shia bloc 

with moderated aims within a unified Iraq. Sistani’s influence 

may be waning, as his words have not succeeded in 

preventing intra-Shia violence or retaliation against Sunnis. 

abdul aziz al-hakim: Hakim is a cleric and the leader 

of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in 

Iraq (SCIRI), the largest and most organized Shia political 

party. It seeks the creation of an autonomous Shia 

region comprising nine provinces in the south. Hakim has 

consistently protected and advanced his party’s position. 

SCIRI has close ties with Iran.





Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditional 

position of power in Iraq. They are torn, unsure whether 

to seek their aims through political participation or through violent 

insurgency. They remain angry about U.S. decisions to 

dissolve Iraqi security forces and to pursue the “de-Baathification” 

of Iraq’s government and society. Sunnis are confronted 

by paradoxes: they have opposed the presence of U.S. forces in 

Iraq but need those forces to protect them against Shia militias; 

they chafe at being governed by a majority Shia administration 

but reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see a Sunni 

autonomous region as feasible for themselves. 

15 

A s s e s s m e n t 

Hashimi and Dhari 

The influence of Sunni Arab politicians in the government 

is questionable. The leadership of the Sunni Arab 

insurgency is murky, but the following two key Sunni 

Arab figures have broad support. 

moqtada al-sadr: Sadr has a large following among 

impoverished Shia, particularly in Baghdad. He has joined 

Maliki’s governing coalition, but his Mahdi Army has 

clashed with the Badr Brigades, as well as with Iraqi, U.S., 

and U.K. forces. Sadr claims to be an Iraqi nationalist. 

Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following 

the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political 

party that controls basic services within the government 

and an armed militia outside of the government.





Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in presenting a united front of two 

main political blocs—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 

and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurds have 

secured a largely autonomous Kurdish region in the north, and 

have achieved a prominent role for Kurds within the national 

government. Barzani leads the Kurdish regional government, 

and Talabani is president of Iraq. 

Leading Kurdish politicians told us they preferred to be 

within a democratic, federal Iraqi state because an independent 

Kurdistan would be surrounded by hostile neighbors. However, 

a majority of Kurds favor independence. The Kurds have 

their own security forces—the peshmerga—which number 

16 

t h e i r aq study group report 

tariq al-hashimi: Hashimi is one of two vice presidents 

of Iraq and the head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the 

largest Sunni Muslim bloc in parliament. Hashimi opposes 

the formation of autonomous regions and has advocated 

the distribution of oil revenues based on population, 

a reversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of Shiite 

militia fighters from the Iraqi security forces. Shiite death 

squads have recently killed three of his siblings. 

sheik harith al-dhari: Dhari is the head of the 

Muslim Scholars Association, the most influential Sunni 

organization in Iraq. Dhari has condemned the American 

occupation and spoken out against the Iraqi government. 

His organization has ties both to the Sunni Arab insurgency 

and to Sunnis within the Iraqi government. A warrant 

was recently issued for his arrest for inciting violence 

and terrorism, an act that sparked bitter Sunni protests 

across Iraq.





Key Issues 

national reconciliation. Prime Minister Maliki outlined 

a commendable program of national reconciliation soon after 

he entered office. However, the Iraqi government has not taken 

action on the key elements of national reconciliation: revising 

17 

A s s e s s m e n t 

Barzani and Talabani 

Kurdish politics has been dominated for years by two figures 

who have long-standing ties in movements for Kurdish 

independence and self-government. 

massoud barzani: Barzani is the leader of the Kurdistan 

Democratic Party and the President of the Kurdish 

regional government. Barzani has cooperated with his 

longtime rival, Jalal Talabani, in securing an empowered, 

autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Barzani has 

ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and raising of Kurdish 

flags in Kurdish-controlled areas. 

jalal talabani: Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic 

Union of Kurdistan and the President of Iraq. Whereas 

Barzani has focused his efforts in Kurdistan, Talabani has 

secured power in Baghdad, and several important PUK 

government ministers are loyal to him. Talabani strongly 

supports autonomy for Kurdistan. He has also sought to 

bring real power to the office of the presidency. 

roughly 100,000. They believe they could accommodate themselves 

to either a unified or a fractured Iraq.





de-Baathification, which prevents many Sunni Arabs from participating 

in governance and society; providing amnesty for those 

who have fought against the government; sharing the country’s 

oil revenues; demobilizing militias; amending the constitution; 

and settling the future of Kirkuk. 

One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Constitution, 

which created a largely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows 

other such regions to be established later, perhaps including a 

“Shi’astan” comprising nine southern provinces. This highly 

decentralized structure is favored by the Kurds and many Shia 

(particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim), but it is 

anathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally Iraqi nationalists, 

albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe they 

should govern. Second, because Iraq’s energy resources are in 

the Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible 

“Sunni region.” Particularly contentious is a provision in the 

constitution that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, 

while allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the 

future to go to the regions. 

The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-

drafting process, and acceded to entering the government 

only on the condition that the constitution be amended. In 

September, the parliament agreed to initiate a constitutional 

review commission slated to complete its work within one year; 

it delayed considering the question of forming a federalized region 

in southern Iraq for eighteen months. 

Another key unresolved issue is the future of Kirkuk, an 

oil-rich city in northern Iraq that is home to substantial numbers 

of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. The Kurds insisted that 

the constitution require a popular referendum by December 

2007 to determine whether Kirkuk can formally join the Kurdish 

administered region, an outcome that Arabs and Turkmen 

18 

t h e i r aq study group report





in Kirkuk staunchly oppose. The risks of further violence 

sparked by a Kirkuk referendum are great. 

Iraq’s leaders often claim that they do not want a division 

of the country, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders 

have little commitment to national reconciliation. One prominent 

Shia leader told us pointedly that the current government 

has the support of 80 percent of the population, notably excluding 

Sunni Arabs. Kurds have fought for independence for 

decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, the leader of 

the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and the 

raising of Kurdish flags. One senior American general commented 

that the Iraqis “still do not know what kind of country 

they want to have.” Yet many of Iraq’s most powerful and wellpositioned 

leaders are not working toward a united Iraq. 

security. The security situation cannot improve unless leaders 

act in support of national reconciliation. Shiite leaders must 

make the decision to demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs must 

make the decision to seek their aims through a peaceful political 

process, not through violent revolt. The Iraqi government 

and Sunni Arab tribes must aggressively pursue al Qaeda. 

Militias are currently seen as legitimate vehicles of political 

action. Shia political leaders make distinctions between the 

Sunni insurgency (which seeks to overthrow the government) 

and Shia militias (which are used to fight Sunnis, secure neighborhoods, 

and maximize power within the government). Though 

Prime Minister Maliki has said he will address the problem of 

militias, he has taken little meaningful action to curb their in- 

fluence. He owes his office in large part to Sadr and has shown 

little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi Army. 

Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon 

violent insurgency in favor of the political process. Sunni 

19 

A s s e s s m e n t





politicians within the government have a limited level of support 

and influence among their own population, and questionable 

influence over the insurgency. Insurgents wage a campaign of intimidation 

against Sunni leaders—assassinating the family members 

of those who do participate in the government. Too often, 

insurgents tolerate and cooperate with al Qaeda, as they share a 

mutual interest in attacking U.S. and Shia forces. However, Sunni 

Arab tribal leaders in Anbar province recently took the positive 

step of agreeing to pursue al Qaeda and foreign fighters in their 

midst, and have started to take action on those commitments. 

Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take 

on the militias; Shia politicians told us that the U.S. military has 

to help them take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda. Each 

side watches the other. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms 

unless the Shia militias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm 

until the Sunni insurgency is destroyed. To put it simply: 

there are many armed groups within Iraq, and very little will to 

lay down arms. 

governance. The Iraqi government is not effectively providing 

its people with basic services: electricity, drinking water, 

sewage, health care, and education. In many sectors, production 

is below or hovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and 

other unstable areas, the situation is much worse. There are 

five major reasons for this problem. 

First, the government sometimes provides services on a 

sectarian basis. For example, in one Sunni neighborhood of 

Shia-governed Baghdad, there is less than two hours of electricity 

each day and trash piles are waist-high. One American 

official told us that Baghdad is run like a “Shia dictatorship” because 

Sunnis boycotted provincial elections in 2005, and therefore 

are not represented in local government. 

20 

t h e i r aq study group report





Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure. 

For instance, electricity transmission towers are 

downed by explosives, and then sniper attacks prevent repairs 

from being made. 

Third, corruption is rampant. One senior Iraqi official estimated 

that official corruption costs Iraq $5–7 billion per year. 

Notable steps have been taken: Iraq has a functioning audit 

board and inspectors general in the ministries, and senior leaders 

including the Prime Minister have identified rooting out 

corruption as a national priority. But too many political leaders 

still pursue their personal, sectarian, or party interests. There 

are still no examples of senior officials who have been brought 

before a court of law and convicted on corruption charges. 

Fourth, capacity is inadequate. Most of Iraq’s technocratic 

class was pushed out of the government as part of de-Baathification. 

Other skilled Iraqis have fled the country as violence has 

risen. Too often, Iraq’s elected representatives treat the ministries 

as political spoils. Many ministries can do little more than pay 

salaries, spending as little as 10–15 percent of their capital 

budget. They lack technical expertise and suffer from corruption, 

inefficiency, a banking system that does not permit the transfer of 

moneys, extensive red tape put in place in part to deter corruption, 

and a Ministry of Finance reluctant to disburse funds. 

Fifth, the judiciary is weak. Much has been done to establish 

an Iraqi judiciary, including a supreme court, and Iraq has 

some dedicated judges. But criminal investigations are conducted 

by magistrates, and they are too few and inadequately 

trained to perform this function. Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary 

has been ruthless. As one senior U.S. official said to us, 

“We can protect judges, but not their families, their extended 

families, their friends.” Many Iraqis feel that crime not only is 

unpunished, it is rewarded. 

21 

A s s e s s m e n t





3. Economics 

There has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has 

tremendous potential for growth. But economic development 

is hobbled by insecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidated 

infrastructure, and uncertainty. As one U.S. official observed 

to us, Iraq’s economy has been badly shocked and is 

dysfunctional after suffering decades of problems: Iraq had a 

police state economy in the 1970s, a war economy in the 1980s, 

and a sanctions economy in the 1990s. Immediate and longterm 

growth depends predominantly on the oil sector. 

Economic Performance 

There are some encouraging signs. Currency reserves are 

stable and growing at $12 billion. Consumer imports of computers, 

cell phones, and other appliances have increased dramatically. 

New businesses are opening, and construction is 

moving forward in secure areas. Because of Iraq’s ample oil reserves, 

water resources, and fertile lands, significant growth is 

possible if violence is reduced and the capacity of government 

improves. For example, wheat yields increased more than 40 

percent in Kurdistan during this past year. 

The Iraqi government has also made progress in meeting 

benchmarks set by the International Monetary Fund. Most 

prominently, subsidies have been reduced—for instance, the 

price per liter of gas has increased from roughly 1.7 cents to 23 

cents (a figure far closer to regional prices). However, energy 

and food subsidies generally remain a burden, costing Iraq $11 

billion per year. 

Despite the positive signs, many leading economic in- 

22 

t h e i r aq study group report





dicators are negative. Instead of meeting a target of 10 

percent, growth in Iraq is at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation 

is above 50 percent. Unemployment estimates range widely from 

20 to 60 percent. The investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct 

investment under 1 percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not 

see tangible improvements in their daily economic situation. 

Oil Sector 

Oil production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq’s 

GDP, and more than 95 percent of government revenues. Iraq 

produces around 2.2 million barrels per day, and exports about 

1.5 million barrels per day. This is below both prewar production 

levels and the Iraqi government’s target of 2.5 million barrels 

per day, and far short of the vast potential of the Iraqi oil 

sector. Fortunately for the government, global energy prices 

have been higher than projected, making it possible for Iraq to 

meet its budget revenue targets. 

Problems with oil production are caused by lack of security, 

lack of investment, and lack of technical capacity. Insurgents 

with a detailed knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure target 

pipelines and oil facilities. There is no metering system for the 

oil. There is poor maintenance at pumping stations, pipelines, 

and port facilities, as well as inadequate investment in modern 

technology. Iraq had a cadre of experts in the oil sector, but intimidation 

and an extended migration of experts to other countries 

have eroded technical capacity. Foreign companies have 

been reluctant to invest, and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil has been unable 

to spend more than 15 percent of its capital budget. 

Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that 

150,000 to 200,000—and perhaps as many as 500,000—barrels 

of oil per day are being stolen. Controlled prices for refined 

23 

A s s e s s m e n t





products result in shortages within Iraq, which drive consumers 

to the thriving black market. One senior U.S. official 

told us that corruption is more responsible than insurgents for 

breakdowns in the oil sector. 

The Politics of Oil 

The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country’s 

already fragile efforts to create a unified central government. 

The Iraqi Constitution leaves the door open for regions 

to take the lead in developing new oil resources. Article 108 

states that “oil and gas are the ownership of all the peoples of 

Iraq in all the regions and governorates,” while Article 109 

tasks the federal government with “the management of oil and 

gas extracted from current fields.” This language has led to 

contention over what constitutes a “new” or an “existing” resource, 

a question that has profound ramifications for the ultimate 

control of future oil revenue. 

Senior members of Iraq’s oil industry argue that a national 

oil company could reduce political tensions by centralizing revenues 

and reducing regional or local claims to a percentage of 

the revenue derived from production. However, regional leaders 

are suspicious and resist this proposal, affirming the rights of 

local communities to have direct access to the inflow of oil revenue. 

Kurdish leaders have been particularly aggressive in asserting 

independent control of their oil assets, signing and 

implementing investment deals with foreign oil companies in 

northern Iraq. Shia politicians are also reported to be negotiating 

oil investment contracts with foreign companies. 

There are proposals to redistribute a portion of oil revenues 

directly to the population on a per capita basis. These 

proposals have the potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in 

24 

t h e i r aq study group report





the nation’s chief natural resource, but it would take time to develop 

a fair distribution system. Oil revenues have been incorporated 

into state budget projections for the next several years. 

There is no institution in Iraq at present that could properly 

implement such a distribution system. It would take substantial 

time to establish, and would have to be based on a well-developed 

state census and income tax system, which Iraq currently lacks. 

U.S.-Led Reconstruction Efforts 

The United States has appropriated a total of about $34 billion 

to support the reconstruction of Iraq, of which about $21 billion 

has been appropriated for the “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund.” Nearly $16 billion has been spent, and almost 

all the funds have been committed. The administration requested 

$1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006, and received 

$1.485 billion. The administration requested $750 

million for FY 2007. The trend line for economic assistance in 

FY 2008 also appears downward. 

Congress has little appetite for appropriating more funds 

for reconstruction. There is a substantial need for continued 

reconstruction in Iraq, but serious questions remain about the 

capacity of the U.S. and Iraqi governments. 

The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense 

Department, State Department, United States Agency for International 

Development, and other agencies has been ineffective. 

There are no clear lines establishing who is in charge of 

reconstruction. 

As resources decline, the U.S. reconstruction effort is 

changing its focus, shifting from infrastructure, education, and 

health to smaller-scale ventures that are chosen and to some 

degree managed by local communities. A major attempt is also 

25 

A s s e s s m e n t





being made to improve the capacity of government bureaucracies 

at the national, regional, and provincial levels to provide 

services to the population as well as to select and manage infrastructure 

projects. 

The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi 

ministries, but it confronts problems with access and sustainability. 

Moqtada al-Sadr objects to the U.S. presence in Iraq, 

and therefore the ministries he controls—Health, Agriculture, 

and Transportation—will not work with Americans. It is not 

clear that Iraqis can or will maintain and operate reconstruction 

projects launched by the United States. 

Several senior military officers commented to us that the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which funds 

quick-impact projects such as the clearing of sewage and the 

restoration of basic services, is vital. The U.S. Agency for International 

Development, in contrast, is focused on long-term 

economic development and capacity building, but funds have 

not been committed to support these efforts into the future. 

The State Department leads seven Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams operating around the country. These teams can have a 

positive effect in secure areas, but not in areas where their 

work is hampered by significant security constraints. 

Substantial reconstruction funds have also been provided 

to contractors, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

has documented numerous instances of waste and 

abuse. They have not all been put right. Contracting has gradually 

improved, as more oversight has been exercised and fewer 

cost-plus contracts have been granted; in addition, the use of 

Iraqi contractors has enabled the employment of more Iraqis 

in reconstruction projects. 

26 

t h e i r aq study group report





4. International Support 

International support for Iraqi reconstruction has been tepid. 

International donors pledged $13.5 billion to support reconstruction, 

but less than $4 billion has been delivered. 

An important agreement with the Paris Club relieved a 

significant amount of Iraq’s government debt and put the country 

on firmer financial footing. But the Gulf States, including 

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, hold large amounts of Iraqi debt that 

they have not forgiven. 

The United States is currently working with the United Nations 

and other partners to fashion the “International Compact” 

on Iraq. The goal is to provide Iraqis with greater debt relief and 

credits from the Gulf States, as well as to deliver on pledged aid 

from international donors. In return, the Iraqi government will 

agree to achieve certain economic reform milestones, such as 

building anticorruption measures into Iraqi institutions, adopting 

a fair legal framework for foreign investors, and reaching economic 

self-sufficiency by 2012. Several U.S. and international of- 

ficials told us that the compact could be an opportunity to seek 

greater international engagement in the country. 

The Region 

The policies and actions of Iraq’s neighbors greatly influence its 

stability and prosperity. No country in the region wants a 

chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are doing little to help it, and 

some are undercutting its stability. Iraqis complain that neighbors 

are meddling in their affairs. When asked which of Iraq’s 

neighbors are intervening in Iraq, one senior Iraqi official 

replied, “All of them.” 

27 

A s s e s s m e n t





The situation in Iraq is linked with events in the region. 

U.S. efforts in Afghanistan have been complicated by the overriding 

focus of U.S. attention and resources on Iraq. Several 

Iraqi, U.S., and international officials commented to us that 

Iraqi opposition to the United States—and support for Sadr— 

spiked in the aftermath of Israel’s bombing campaign in 

Lebanon. The actions of Syria and Iran in Iraq are often tied to 

their broader concerns with the United States. Many Sunni 

Arab states are concerned about rising Iranian influence in Iraq 

and the region. Most of the region’s countries are wary of U.S. 

efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and the Middle East. 

Neighboring States 

iran. Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq. 

Iran has long-standing ties to many Iraqi Shia politicians, many 

of whom were exiled to Iran during the Saddam Hussein 

regime. Iran has provided arms, financial support, and training 

for Shiite militias within Iraq, as well as political support for 

Shia parties. There are also reports that Iran has supplied improvised 

explosive devices to groups—including Sunni Arab insurgents—

that attack U.S. forces. The Iranian border with Iraq 

is porous, and millions of Iranians travel to Iraq each year to 

visit Shia holy sites. Many Iraqis spoke of Iranian meddling, 

and Sunnis took a particularly alarmist view. One leading Sunni 

politician told us, “If you turn over any stone in Iraq today, you 

will find Iran underneath.” 

U.S., Iraqi, and international officials also commented on 

the range of tensions between the United States and Iran, including 

Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism, 

Iran’s influence in Lebanon and the region, and Iran’s influence 

in Iraq. Iran appears content for the U.S. military to be tied 

28 

t h e i r aq study group report





down in Iraq, a position that limits U.S. options in addressing 

Iran’s nuclear program and allows Iran leverage over stability in 

Iraq. Proposed talks between Iran and the United States about 

the situation in Iraq have not taken place. One Iraqi official 

told us: “Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets 

of Baghdad.” 

syria. Syria is also playing a counterproductive role. Iraqis 

are upset about what they perceive as Syrian support for efforts 

to undermine the Iraqi government. The Syrian role is not so 

much to take active measures as to countenance malign neglect: 

the Syrians look the other way as arms and foreign fighters 

flow across their border into Iraq, and former Baathist leaders 

find a safe haven within Syria. Like Iran, Syria is content to see 

the United States tied down in Iraq. That said, the Syrians have 

indicated that they want a dialogue with the United States, and 

in November 2006 agreed to restore diplomatic relations with 

Iraq after a 24-year break. 

saudi arabia and the gulf states. These countries for 

the most part have been passive and disengaged. They have declined 

to provide debt relief or substantial economic assistance 

to the Iraqi government. Several Iraqi Sunni Arab politicians 

complained that Saudi Arabia has not provided political support 

for their fellow Sunnis within Iraq. One observed that 

Saudi Arabia did not even send a letter when the Iraqi government 

was formed, whereas Iran has an ambassador in Iraq. 

Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals 

within Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, even as those governments 

help facilitate U.S. military operations in Iraq by 

providing basing and overflight rights and by cooperating on intelligence 

issues. 

29 

A s s e s s m e n t





As worries about Iraq increase, the Gulf States are becoming 

more active. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have 

hosted meetings in support of the International Compact. Saudi 

Arabia recently took the positive step of hosting a conference of 

Iraqi religious leaders in Mecca. Several Gulf States have helped 

foster dialogue with Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. While the Gulf 

States are not proponents of democracy in Iraq, they worry about 

the direction of events: battle-hardened insurgents from Iraq 

could pose a threat to their own internal stability, and the growth 

of Iranian influence in the region is deeply troubling to them. 

turkey. Turkish policy toward Iraq is focused on discouraging 

Kurdish nationalism, which is seen as an existential threat 

to Turkey’s own internal stability. The Turks have supported the 

Turkmen minority within Iraq and have used their influence to 

try to block the incorporation of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan. At 

the same time, Turkish companies have invested in Kurdish 

areas in northern Iraq, and Turkish and Kurdish leaders have 

sought constructive engagement on political, security, and economic 

issues. 

The Turks are deeply concerned about the operations of the 

Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)—a terrorist group based in northern 

Iraq that has killed thousands of Turks. They are upset that 

the United States and Iraq have not targeted the PKK more aggressively. 

The Turks have threatened to go after the PKK themselves, 

and have made several forays across the border into Iraq. 

jordan and egypt. Both Jordan and Egypt have provided 

some assistance for the Iraqi government. Jordan has trained 

thousands of Iraqi police, has an ambassador in Baghdad, and 

King Abdullah recently hosted a meeting in Amman between 

President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki. Egypt has provided 

30 

t h e i r aq study group report





some limited Iraqi army training. Both Jordan and Egypt have 

facilitated U.S. military operations—Jordan by allowing over- 

flight and search-and-rescue operations, Egypt by allowing 

overflight and Suez Canal transits; both provide important cooperation 

on intelligence. Jordan is currently home to 700,000 

Iraqi refugees (equal to 10 percent of its population) and fears 

a flood of many more. Both Jordan and Egypt are concerned 

about the position of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and want constitutional 

reforms in Iraq to bolster the Sunni community. They also fear 

the return of insurgents to their countries. 

The International Community 

The international community beyond the United Kingdom and 

our other coalition partners has played a limited role in Iraq. 

The United Nations—acting under Security Council Resolution 

1546—has a small presence in Iraq; it has assisted in holding 

elections, drafting the constitution, organizing the government, 

and building institutions. The World Bank, which has committed 

a limited number of resources, has one and sometimes two 

staff in Iraq. The European Union has a representative there. 

Several U.S.-based and international nongovernmental 

organizations have done excellent work within Iraq, operating 

under great hardship. Both Iraqi and international nongovernmental 

organizations play an important role in reaching across 

sectarian lines to enhance dialogue and understanding, and 

several U.S.-based organizations have employed substantial resources 

to help Iraqis develop their democracy. However, the 

participation of international nongovernmental organizations is 

constrained by the lack of security, and their Iraqi counterparts 

face a cumbersome and often politicized process of registration 

with the government. 

31 

A s s e s s m e n t





The United Kingdom has dedicated an extraordinary 

amount of resources to Iraq and has made great sacrifices. In 

addition to 7,200 troops, the United Kingdom has a substantial 

diplomatic presence, particularly in Basra and the Iraqi southeast. 

The United Kingdom has been an active and key player at 

every stage of Iraq’s political development. U.K. officials told 

us that they remain committed to working for stability in Iraq, 

and will reduce their commitment of troops and resources in 

response to the situation on the ground. 

5. Conclusions 

The United States has made a massive commitment to the future 

of Iraq in both blood and treasure. As of December 2006, 

nearly 2,900 Americans have lost their lives serving in Iraq. Another 

21,000 Americans have been wounded, many severely. 

To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion 

on the Iraq War, and costs are running about $8 billion per 

month. In addition, the United States must expect significant 

“tail costs” to come. Caring for veterans and replacing lost 

equipment will run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Estimates 

run as high as $2 trillion for the final cost of the U.S. involvement 

in Iraq. 

Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive 

and the situation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot 

now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of 

the United States. Iraqis have not been convinced that they 

must take responsibility for their own future. Iraq’s neighbors 

and much of the international community have not been persuaded 

to play an active and constructive role in supporting 

Iraq. The ability of the United States to shape outcomes is diminishing. 

Time is running out. 

32 

t h e i r aq study group report





B. Consequences of Continued 

Decline in Iraq 

If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences 

could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, 

and the world. 

Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and 

inflict greater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse of 

Iraq’s government and economy would further cripple a country 

already unable to meet its people’s needs. Iraq’s security 

forces could split along sectarian lines. A humanitarian catastrophe 

could follow as more refugees are forced to relocate 

across the country and the region. Ethnic cleansing could escalate. 

The Iraqi people could be subjected to another strongman 

who flexes the political and military muscle required to impose 

order amid anarchy. Freedoms could be lost. 

Other countries in the region fear significant violence 

crossing their borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries 

to intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps 

sparking a broader regional war. Turkey could send troops into 

northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan from declaring independence. 

Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern 

Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil fields. The regional 

33





influence of Iran could rise at a time when that country is on a 

path to producing nuclear weapons. 

Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that 

they fear the distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across 

the Islamic world. Many expressed a fear of Shia insurrections—

perhaps fomented by Iran—in Sunni-ruled states. Such 

a broader sectarian conflict could open a Pandora’s box of problems—

including the radicalization of populations, mass movements 

of populations, and regime changes—that might take 

decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads to the 

other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could 

lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm 

the global economy. 

Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, “Al 

Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald’s.” Left 

unchecked, al Qaeda in Iraq could continue to incite violence 

between Sunnis and Shia. A chaotic Iraq could provide a still 

stronger base of operations for terrorists who seek to act regionally 

or even globally. Al Qaeda will portray any failure by 

the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured 

prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region 

and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to Osama 

bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they will 

seek to expel the Americans and then spread “the jihad wave to 

the secular countries neighboring Iraq.” A senior European of- 

ficial told us that failure in Iraq could incite terrorist attacks 

within his country. 

The global standing of the United States could suffer if 

Iraq descends further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and 

strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities. 

Perceived failure there could diminish America’s credibility 

and influence in a region that is the center of the Islamic world 

34 

t h e i r aq study group report





and vital to the world’s energy supply. This loss would reduce 

America’s global influence at a time when pressing issues in 

North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand our full attention 

and strong U.S. leadership of international alliances. And the 

longer that U.S. political and military resources are tied down 

in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in 

Afghanistan increase. 

Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization 

within the United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans 

disapprove of the government’s handling of the war, and more 

than 60 percent feel that there is no clear plan for moving forward. 

The November elections were largely viewed as a referendum 

on the progress in Iraq. Arguments about continuing to 

provide security and assistance to Iraq will fall on deaf ears if 

Americans become disillusioned with the government that the 

United States invested so much to create. U.S. foreign policy 

cannot be successfully sustained without the broad support of 

the American people. 

Continued problems in Iraq could also lead to greater 

Iraqi opposition to the United States. Recent polling indicates 

that only 36 percent of Iraqis feel their country is heading in 

the right direction, and 79 percent of Iraqis have a “mostly negative” 

view of the influence that the United States has in their 

country. Sixty-one percent of Iraqis approve of attacks on U.S.- 

led forces. If Iraqis continue to perceive Americans as representing 

an occupying force, the United States could become its 

own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny. 

These and other predictions of dire consequences in Iraq 

and the region are by no means a certainty. Iraq has taken several 

positive steps since Saddam Hussein was overthrown: 

Iraqis restored full sovereignty, conducted open national elections, 

drafted a permanent constitution, ratified that constitu- 

35 

A s s e s s m e n t





tion, and elected a new government pursuant to that constitution. 

Iraqis may become so sobered by the prospect of an unfolding 

civil war and intervention by their regional neighbors 

that they take the steps necessary to avert catastrophe. But at 

the moment, such a scenario seems implausible because the 

Iraqi people and their leaders have been slow to demonstrate 

the capacity or will to act. 

36 

t h e i r aq study group report





C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq 

Because of the gravity of the situation in Iraq and of its consequences 

for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world, 

the Iraq Study Group has carefully considered the full range of 

alternative approaches for moving forward. We recognize that 

there is no perfect solution and that all that have been suggested 

have flaws. The following are some of the more notable 

possibilities that we have considered. 

1. Precipitate Withdrawal 

Because of the importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, 

and the role and commitments of the United States in initiating 

events that have led to the current situation, we believe 

it would be wrong for the United States to abandon the country 

through a precipitate withdrawal of troops and support. A premature 

American departure from Iraq would almost certainly 

produce greater sectarian violence and further deterioration of 

conditions, leading to a number of the adverse consequences 

outlined above. The near-term results would be a significant 

power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional destabilization, 

37





and a threat to the global economy. Al Qaeda would depict our 

withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave and Iraq descends 

into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventually require 

the United States to return. 

2. Staying the Course 

Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in 

Iraq is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. 

Making no changes in policy would simply delay 

the day of reckoning at a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are 

dying every month. The United States is spending $2 billion a 

week. Our ability to respond to other international crises is 

constrained. A majority of the American people are soured on 

the war. This level of expense is not sustainable over an extended 

period, especially when progress is not being made. 

The longer the United States remains in Iraq without progress, 

the more resentment will grow among Iraqis who believe they 

are subjects of a repressive American occupation. As one U.S. 

official said to us, “Our leaving would make it worse. . . . The 

current approach without modification will not make it better.” 

3. More Troops for Iraq 

Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the 

fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of 

national reconciliation. A senior American general told us that 

adding U.S. troops might temporarily help limit violence in a 

highly localized area. However, past experience indicates that 

the violence would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are 

moved to another area. As another American general told us, if 

the Iraqi government does not make political progress, “all the 

38 

t h e i r aq study group report





troops in the world will not provide security.” Meanwhile, 

America’s military capacity is stretched thin: we do not have the 

troops or equipment to make a substantial, sustained increase 

in our troop presence. Increased deployments to Iraq would also 

necessarily hamper our ability to provide adequate resources 

for our efforts in Afghanistan or respond to crises around the 

world. 

4. Devolution to Three Regions 

The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous 

regions with loose central control would be too high. 

Because Iraq’s population is not neatly separated, regional 

boundaries cannot be easily drawn. All eighteen Iraqi provinces 

have mixed populations, as do Baghdad and most other major 

cities in Iraq. A rapid devolution could result in mass population 

movements, collapse of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening 

of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization of neighboring 

states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate Iraqi regions. 

Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division 

would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the 

United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state. 

While such devolution is a possible consequence of continued 

instability in Iraq, we do not believe the United States 

should support this course as a policy goal or impose this outcome 

on the Iraqi state. If events were to move irreversibly in 

this direction, the United States should manage the situation to 

ameliorate humanitarian consequences, contain the spread of 

violence, and minimize regional instability. The United States 

should support as much as possible central control by governmental 

authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question of 

oil revenues. 

39 

A s s e s s m e n t





D. Achieving Our Goals 

We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the 

President: an Iraq that can “govern itself, sustain itself, and defend 

itself.” In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with a 

broadly representative government that maintains its territorial 

integrity, is at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, 

and doesn’t brutalize its own people. Given the current 

situation in Iraq, achieving this goal will require much time and 

will depend primarily on the actions of the Iraqi people. 

In our judgment, there is a new way forward for the 

United States to support this objective, and it will offer people 

of Iraq a reasonable opportunity to lead a better life than they 

did under Saddam Hussein. Our recommended course has 

shortcomings, as does each of the policy alternatives we have 

reviewed. We firmly believe, however, that it includes the best 

strategies and tactics available to us to positively influence the 

outcome in Iraq and the region. We believe that it could enable 

a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a chance 

to pursue a better future, as well as serving America’s interests 

and values in the years ahead. 

40





II 

The Way Forward— 

A New Approach 

Progress in Iraq is still possible if new approaches are taken 

promptly by Iraq, the United States, and other countries that 

have a stake in the Middle East. 

To attain the goals we have outlined, changes in course 

must be made both outside and inside Iraq. Our report offers a 

comprehensive strategy to build regional and international 

support for stability in Iraq, as it encourages the Iraqi people to 

assume control of their own destiny. It offers a responsible 

transition. 

Externally, the United States should immediately begin to 

employ all elements of American power to construct a regional 

mechanism that can support, rather than retard, progress in 

Iraq. Internally, the Iraqi government must take the steps required 

to achieve national reconciliation, reduce violence, and 

improve the daily lives of Iraqis. Efforts to implement these external 

and internal strategies must begin now and must be undertaken 

in concert with one another. 

This responsible transition can allow for a reduction in 

the U.S. presence in Iraq over time.









A. The External Approach: Building 

an International Consensus 

The United States must build a new international consensus 

for stability in Iraq and the region. 

In order to foster such consensus, the United States should 

embark on a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international 

support structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in 

other countries in the region. This support structure should include 

every country that has an interest in averting a chaotic 

Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors—Iran and Syria among 

them. Despite the well-known differences between many of 

these countries, they all share an interest in avoiding the horrific 

consequences that would flow from a chaotic Iraq, particularly a 

humanitarian catastrophe and regional destabilization. 

A reinvigorated diplomatic effort is required because it is 

clear that the Iraqi government cannot succeed in governing, 

defending, and sustaining itself by relying on U.S. military and 

economic support alone. Nor can the Iraqi government succeed 

by relying only on U.S. military support in conjunction 

with Iraqi military and police capabilities. Some states have 

been withholding commitments they could make to support 

Iraq’s stabilization and reconstruction. Some states have been 

43





actively undermining stability in Iraq. To achieve a political solution 

within Iraq, a broader international support structure is 

needed. 

1. The New Diplomatic Offensive 

Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other 

major regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To 

put it simply, all key issues in the Middle East—the Arab- 

Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic 

reforms, and extremism and terrorism—are inextricably linked. 

In addition to supporting stability in Iraq, a comprehensive 

diplomatic offensive—the New Diplomatic Offensive—should 

address these key regional issues. By doing so, it would help 

marginalize extremists and terrorists, promote U.S. values and 

interests, and improve America’s global image. 

Under the diplomatic offensive, we propose regional and 

international initiatives and steps to assist the Iraqi government 

in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones. 

Achieving these milestones will require at least the acquiescence 

of Iraq’s neighbors, and their active and timely 

cooperation would be highly desirable. 

The diplomatic offensive would extend beyond the primarily 

economic “Compact for Iraq” by also emphasizing political, 

diplomatic, and security issues. At the same time, it would 

be coordinated with the goals of the Compact for Iraq. The 

diplomatic offensive would also be broader and more farreaching 

than the “Gulf Plus Two” efforts currently being conducted, 

and those efforts should be folded into and become 

part of the diplomatic offensive. 

States included within the diplomatic offensive can play a 

major role in reinforcing national reconciliation efforts be- 

44 

t h e i r aq study group report





tween Iraqi Sunnis and Shia. Such reinforcement would contribute 

substantially to legitimizing of the political process in 

Iraq. Iraq’s leaders may not be able to come together unless 

they receive the necessary signals and support from abroad. 

This backing will not materialize of its own accord, and must be 

encouraged urgently by the United States. 

In order to advance a comprehensive diplomatic solution, 

the Study Group recommends as follows: 

RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with 

the Iraqi government, should launch the comprehensive New 

Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and 

of the region. This new diplomatic offensive should be 

launched before December 31, 2006. 

RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive 

as it relates to regional players should be to: 

i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. 

ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s 

neighbors. 

iii. Secure Iraq’s borders, including the use of joint patrols 

with neighboring countries. 

iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond 

Iraq’s borders. 

v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political 

support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi 

government from non-neighboring Muslim nations. 

45 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation 

in Iraq. 

vii. Validate Iraq’s legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, 

where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in 

Baghdad. 

viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key 

capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). 

ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on 

Kirkuk. 

x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, 

political, and economic milestones, including better 

performance on issues such as national reconciliation, equitable 

distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of 

militias. 

RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic 

offensive, and in addition to the Support Group discussed 

below, the United States and the Iraqi government should 

support the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of 

the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab 

League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national 

reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic 

presence in Iraq. 

2. The Iraq International Support Group 

This new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includes 

the active participation of those countries that have a crit- 

46 

t h e i r aq study group report





ical stake in preventing Iraq from falling into chaos. To encourage 

their participation, the United States should immediately 

seek the creation of the Iraq International Support Group. The 

Support Group should also include all countries that border Iraq 

as well as other key countries in the region and the world. 

The Support Group would not seek to impose obligations 

or undertakings on the government of Iraq. Instead, the Support 

Group would assist Iraq in ways the government of Iraq 

would desire, attempting to strengthen Iraq’s sovereignty—not 

diminish it. 

It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq’s 

neighbors are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a 

unified Iraq that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, 

but not so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None 

favors the breakup of the Iraqi state. Each country in the region 

views the situation in Iraq through the filter of its particular 

set of interests. For example: 

• Turkey opposes an independent or even highly autonomous 

Kurdistan because of its own national security considerations. 

• Iran backs Shia claims and supports various Shia militias in 

Iraq, but it also supports other groups in order to enhance its 

influence and hedge its bets on possible outcomes. 

• Syria, despite facilitating support for Iraqi insurgent groups, 

would be threatened by the impact that the breakup of Iraq 

would have on its own multiethnic and multiconfessional 

society. 

• Kuwait wants to ensure that it will not once again be the victim 

of Iraqi irredentism and aggression. 

47 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





• Saudi Arabia and Jordan share Sunni concerns over Shia ascendancy 

in Iraq and the region as a whole. 

• The other Arab Gulf states also recognize the benefits of an 

outcome in Iraq that does not destabilize the region and exacerbate 

Shia-Sunni tensions. 

• None of Iraq’s neighbors—especially major countries such as 

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel—see it in their interest for 

the situation in Iraq to lead to aggrandized regional influence 

by Iran. Indeed, they may take active steps to limit Iran’s in- 

fluence, steps that could lead to an intraregional conflict. 

Left to their own devices, these governments will tend to 

reinforce ethnic, sectarian, and political divisions within Iraqi 

society. But if the Support Group takes a systematic and active 

approach toward considering the concerns of each country, we 

believe that each can be encouraged to play a positive role in 

Iraq and the region. 

saudi arabia. Saudi Arabia’s agreement not to intervene 

with assistance to Sunni Arab Iraqis could be an essential quid 

pro quo for similar forbearance on the part of other neighbors, 

especially Iran. The Saudis could use their Islamic credentials 

to help reconcile differences between Iraqi factions and build 

broader support in the Islamic world for a stabilization agreement, 

as their recent hosting of a meeting of Islamic religious 

leaders in Mecca suggests. If the government in Baghdad pursues 

a path of national reconciliation with the Sunnis, the Saudis 

could help Iraq confront and eliminate al Qaeda in Iraq. They 

could also cancel the Iraqi debt owed them. In addition, the 

Saudis might be helpful in persuading the Syrians to cooperate. 

48 

t h e i r aq study group report





turkey. As a major Sunni Muslim country on Iraq’s borders, 

Turkey can be a partner in supporting the national reconciliation 

process in Iraq. Such efforts can be particularly helpful 

given Turkey’s interest in Kurdistan remaining an integral part 

of a unified Iraq and its interest in preventing a safe haven for 

Kurdish terrorists (the PKK). 

egypt. Because of its important role in the Arab world, 

Egypt should be encouraged to foster the national reconciliation 

process in Iraq with a focus on getting the Sunnis to participate. 

At the same time, Egypt has the means, and indeed has 

offered, to train groups of Iraqi military and security forces in 

Egypt on a rotational basis. 

jordan. Jordan, like Egypt, can help in the national reconciliation 

process in Iraq with the Sunnis. It too has the professional 

capability to train and equip Iraqi military and security forces. 

RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New 

Diplomatic Offensive, an Iraq International Support Group 

should be organized immediately following the launch of the 

New Diplomatic Offensive. 

RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist 

of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and 

Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf 

States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security 

Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself. 

Other countries—for instance, Germany, Japan and 

South Korea—that might be willing to contribute to resolving 

political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting 

Iraq could also become members. 

49 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive 

and the work of the Support Group should be carried out 

with urgency, and should be conducted by and organized at 

the level of foreign minister or above. The Secretary of State, 

if not the President, should lead the U.S. effort. That effort 

should be both bilateral and multilateral, as circumstances 

require. 

RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on 

the participation of the office of the United Nations Secretary- 

General in its work. The United Nations Secretary-General 

should designate a Special Envoy as his representative. 

RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the 

New Diplomatic Offensive, should develop specific approaches 

to neighboring countries that take into account the 

interests, perspectives, and potential contributions as suggested 

above. 

3. Dealing with Iran and Syria 

Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is 

our view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its 

adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences 

consistent with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support 

Group should actively engage Iran and Syria in its 

diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions. 

The Study Group recognizes that U.S. relationships with 

Iran and Syria involve difficult issues that must be resolved. 

Diplomatic talks should be extensive and substantive, and they 

will require a balancing of interests. The United States has 

diplomatic, economic, and military disincentives available in 

50 

t h e i r aq study group report





approaches to both Iran and Syria. However, the United States 

should also consider incentives to try to engage them constructively, 

much as it did successfully with Libya. 

Some of the possible incentives to Iran, Syria, or both include: 

i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors 

and the region. 

ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the 

Taliban from destabilizing Afghanistan. 

iii. Accession to international organizations, including the World 

Trade Organization. 

iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United 

States. 

v. The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and 

economic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocating 

regime change. 

vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated 

between Israel and Syria, with U.S. involvement 

as part of a broader initiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlined 

below. 

RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic 

Offensive and the Support Group, the United States 

should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to 

obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq 

and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and Iran, the 

51 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





United States should consider incentives, as well as disincentives, 

in seeking constructive results. 

iran. Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state 

of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Yet the United States and Iran 

cooperated in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore 

whether this model can be replicated in the case of Iraq. 

Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United 

States bogged down in Iraq, Iran’s interests would not be 

served by a failure of U.S. policy in Iraq that led to chaos and 

the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran’s population 

is slightly more than 50 percent Persian, but it has a large Azeri 

minority (24 percent of the population) as well as Kurdish and 

Arab minorities. Worst-case scenarios in Iraq could inflame 

sectarian tensions within Iran, with serious consequences for 

Iranian national security interests. 

Our limited contacts with Iran’s government lead us to 

believe that its leaders are likely to say they will not participate 

in diplomatic efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute 

this reluctance to their belief that the United States seeks 

regime change in Iran. 

Nevertheless, as one of Iraq’s neighbors Iran should be 

asked to assume its responsibility to participate in the Support 

Group. An Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq 

and the rest of the world Iran’s rejectionist attitude and approach, 

which could lead to its isolation. Further, Iran’s refusal 

to cooperate on this matter would diminish its prospects of engaging 

with the United States in the broader dialogue it seeks. 

RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs 

should continue to be dealt with by the United Nations 

Security Council and its five permanent members (i.e., the 

52 

t h e i r aq study group report





United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) 

plus Germany. 

RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts within the 

Support Group should seek to persuade Iran that it should 

take specific steps to improve the situation in Iraq. 

Among steps Iran could usefully take are the following: 

• Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and 

training to any group resorting to violence in Iraq. 

• Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity 

of Iraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty 

of Iraq and its government. 

• Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, 

to encourage national reconciliation. 

• Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic 

reconstruction of Iraq. 

syria. Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point, 

both countries have important interests in the region that could 

be enhanced if they were able to establish some common 

ground on how to move forward. This approach worked effectively 

in the early 1990s. In this context, Syria’s national interests 

in the Arab-Israeli dispute are important and can be brought 

into play. 

Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq’s stability in 

several ways. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends the 

following: 

53 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support 

Group should encourage and persuade Syria of the 

merit of such contributions as the following: 

• Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent 

possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols 

on the border. Doing so will help stem the flow of 

funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq. 

• Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with 

the Iraqis. 

• Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation 

with Iraq.

4. The Wider Regional Context 

The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the 

Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the 

Arab-Israeli conflict. 

There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by 

the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all 

fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment 

to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This 

commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between 

Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to 

exist), and particularly Syria—which is the principal transit 

point for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah, and which supports 

radical Palestinian groups. 

The United States does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding 

direct involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several 

reasons, we should act boldly: 

54 

t h e i r aq study group report





• There is no military solution to this conflict. 

• The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being a 

nation perpetually at war. 

• No American administration—Democratic or Republican— 

will ever abandon Israel. 

• Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the Arab- 

Israeli dispute because it is an axiom that when the political 

process breaks down there will be violence on the ground. 

• The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set 

forth in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and 

in the principle of “land for peace.” 

• The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace 

such as Israel has achieved with Egypt and Jordan. 

This effort would strongly support moderate Arab governments 

in the region, especially the democratically elected 

government of Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority under 

President Mahmoud Abbas. 

RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and 

sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive 

Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon and Syria, and 

President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution 

for Israel and Palestine. 

RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include—as 

soon as possible—the unconditional calling and holding of 

55 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





meetings, under the auspices of the United States or the 

Quartet (i.e., the United States, Russia, European Union, and 

the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon and Syria 

on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who acknowledge 

Israel’s right to exist) on the other. The purpose of these 

meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the 

Madrid Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks— 

one Syrian/Lebanese, and the other Palestinian. 

RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements 

of that negotiated peace should be: 

• Syria’s full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 

1701 of August 2006, which provides the framework for 

Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory. 

• Syria’s full cooperation with all investigations into political 

assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik 

Hariri and Pierre Gemayel. 

• A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use 

of Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons 

and aid to Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel’s 

problem with Hezbollah.) 

• Syria’s use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah 

for the release of the captured Israeli Defense Force 

soldiers. 

• A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the 

democratically elected government of Lebanon. 

56 

t h e i r aq study group report





• A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting 

through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian 

groups. 

• A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment 

of Israel’s right to exist. 

• Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and 

in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis 

should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee 

for Israel that could include an international force on the 

border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties. 

RECOMMENDATION 17: Concerning the Palestinian issue, 

elements of that negotiated peace should include: 

• Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 

338 and to the principle of land for peace, which are the 

only bases for achieving peace. 

• Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas 

and the Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing 

the way for negotiations with Israel. 

• A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating 

the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians 

and the Israelis in November 2006. 

• Support for a Palestinian national unity government. 

57 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





• Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement 

along the lines of President Bush’s two-state solution, which 

would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements, 

Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict. 

Afghanistan 

At the same time, we must not lose sight of the importance of 

the situation inside Afghanistan and the renewed threat posed 

by the Taliban. Afghanistan’s borders are porous. If the Taliban 

were to control more of Afghanistan, it could provide al Qaeda 

the political space to conduct terrorist operations. This development 

would destabilize the region and have national security 

implications for the United States and other countries around 

the world. Also, the significant increase in poppy production in 

Afghanistan fuels the illegal drug trade and narco-terrorism. 

The huge focus of U.S. political, military, and economic 

support on Iraq has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan. 

As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq 

and the Middle East, it must also give priority to the situation 

in Afghanistan. Doing so may require increased political, security, 

and military measures. 

RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States 

to provide additional political, economic, and military support 

for Afghanistan, including resources that might become 

available as combat forces are moved from Iraq. 

58 

t h e i r aq study group report





B.The Internal Approach: 

Helping Iraqis Help Themselves 

The New Diplomatic Offensive will provide the proper external 

environment and support for the difficult internal steps that 

the Iraqi government must take to promote national reconciliation, 

establish security, and make progress on governance. 

The most important issues facing Iraq’s future are now 

the responsibility of Iraq’s elected leaders. Because of the security 

and assistance it provides, the United States has a signifi- 

cant role to play. Yet only the government and people of Iraq 

can make and sustain certain decisions critical to Iraq’s future. 

1. Performance on Milestones 

The United States should work closely with Iraq’s leaders to 

support the achievement of specific objectives—or milestones—

on national reconciliation, security, and governance. 

Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the 

right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government 

needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens of the United 

States and other countries—that it deserves continued support. 

59





The U.S. government must make clear that it expects 

action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward 

these milestones. Such a message can be sent only at the 

level of our national leaders, and only in person, during direct 

consultation. 

As President Bush’s meeting with Prime Minister Maliki 

in Amman, Jordan demonstrates, it is important for the President 

to remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi 

leadership. There is no substitute for sustained dialogue at the 

highest levels of government. 

During these high-level exchanges, the United States 

should lay out an agenda for continued support to help Iraq 

achieve milestones, as well as underscoring the consequences 

if Iraq does not act. It should be unambiguous that continued 

U.S. political, military, and economic support for Iraq depends 

on the Iraqi government’s demonstrating political will and 

making substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones 

on national reconciliation, security, and governance. 

The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces 

units from the United States to Iraq should be influenced by 

Iraq’s performance on milestones. 

The United States should also signal that it is seeking broad 

international support for Iraq on behalf of achieving these milestones. 

The United States can begin to shape a positive climate 

for its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq, 

through public statements by President Bush that reject the notion 

that the United States seeks to control Iraq’s oil, or seeks 

permanent military bases within Iraq. However, the United 

States could consider a request from Iraq for temporary bases. 

RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership 

of his national security team should remain in close and fre- 

60 

t h e i r aq study group report





quent contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts must 

convey a clear message: there must be action by the Iraqi government 

to make substantial progress toward the achievement 

of milestones. In public diplomacy, the President should 

convey as much detail as possible about the substance of these 

exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi 

people, and the countries in the region well informed. 

RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates 

political will and makes substantial progress toward 

the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, 

and governance, the United States should make clear its 

willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for 

Iraq’s security forces, and to continue political, military, and 

economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq becomes 

more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, 

the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced. 

RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not 

make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones 

on national reconciliation, security, and governance, 

the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic 

support for the Iraqi government. 

RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that 

the United States does not seek permanent military bases in 

Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary 

base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that 

request as it would in the case of any other government. 

RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that 

the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil. 

61 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





Milestones for Iraq 

The government of Iraq understands that dramatic steps are 

necessary to avert a downward spiral and make progress. Prime 

Minister Maliki has worked closely in consultation with the 

United States and has put forward the following milestones in 

the key areas of national reconciliation, security and governance: 

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 

By the end of 2006–early 2007: 

.Approval of the Provincial Election Law and setting an 

election date 

.Approval of the Petroleum Law 

.Approval of the De-Baathification Law 

.Approval of the Militia Law 

By March 2007: 

.A referendum on constitutional amendments (if it is necessary) 

By May 2007: 

.Completion of Militia Law implementation 

.Approval of amnesty agreement 

.Completion of reconciliation efforts 

62 

t h e i r aq study group report





By June 2007: 

.Provincial elections 

SECURITY (pending joint U.S.-Iraqi review) 

By the end of 2006: 

.Iraqi increase of 2007 security spending over 2006 levels 

By April 2007: 

.Iraqi control of the Army 

By September 2007: 

.Iraqi control of provinces 

By December 2007: 

.Iraqi security self-reliance (with U.S. support) 

GOVERNANCE 

By the end of 2006: 

.The Central Bank of Iraq will raise interest rates to 20 

percent and appreciate the Iraqi dinar by 10 percent to 

combat accelerating inflation. 

.Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleum 

products and sell imported fuel at market prices. 

63 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated completion 

dates of the end of 2006 or early 2007 for some milestones 

may not be realistic. These should be completed by the first 

quarter of 2007. 

RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good 

start. The United States should consult closely with the Iraqi 

government and develop additional milestones in three 

areas: national reconciliation, security, and improving government 

services affecting the daily lives of Iraqis. As with 

the current milestones, these additional milestones should be 

tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible. 

2. National Reconciliation 

National reconciliation is essential to reduce further violence 

and maintain the unity of Iraq. 

U.S. forces can help provide stability for a time to enable 

Iraqi leaders to negotiate political solutions, but they cannot 

stop the violence—or even contain it—if there is no underlying 

political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their 

country. 

The Iraqi government must send a clear signal to Sunnis 

that there is a place for them in national life. The government 

needs to act now, to give a signal of hope. Unless Sunnis believe 

they can get a fair deal in Iraq through the political process, 

there is no prospect that the insurgency will end. To strike this 

fair deal, the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people must address 

several issues that are critical to the success of national 

reconciliation and thus to the future of Iraq. 

64 

t h e i r aq study group report





Steps for Iraq to Take on Behalf of 

National Reconciliation 

RECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of 

the constitution is essential to national reconciliation and 

should be pursued on an urgent basis. The United Nations has 

expertise in this field, and should play a role in this process. 

RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliation 

requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab 

nationalists into national life, with the leading figures of Saddam 

Hussein’s regime excluded. The United States should encourage 

the return of qualified Iraqi professionals—Sunni or 

Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd or Turkmen or Christian 

or Arab—into the government. 

RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues 

should accrue to the central government and be shared 

on the basis of population. No formula that gives control over 

revenues from future fields to the regions or gives control of 

oil fields to the regions is compatible with national reconciliation. 

RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial 

elections should be held at the earliest possible date. Under 

the constitution, new provincial elections should have been 

held already. They are necessary to restore representative 

government. 

RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous 

situation in Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary 

to avert communal violence. Kirkuk’s mix of Kurdish, Arab, 

65 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





and Turkmen populations could make it a powder keg. A referendum 

on the future of Kirkuk (as required by the Iraqi 

Constitution before the end of 2007) would be explosive and 

should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the agenda 

of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New 

Diplomatic Offensive. 

RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals 

must be far-reaching. Any successful effort at national reconciliation 

must involve those in the government finding ways 

and means to reconcile with former bitter enemies. 

RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women 

and the rights of all minority communities in Iraq, including 

Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, 

must be protected. 

RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government 

should stop using the process of registering nongovernmental 

organizations as a tool for politicizing or stopping 

their activities. Registration should be solely an administrative 

act, not an occasion for government censorship and interference. 

Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf of 

National Reconciliation 

The United States can take several steps to assist in Iraq’s reconciliation 

process. 

The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest 

in a national reconciliation dialogue. The point is not for the 

66 

t h e i r aq study group report





United States to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an 

approach that we oppose. The point is for the United States 

and Iraq to make clear their shared interest in the orderly departure 

of U.S. forces as Iraqi forces take on the security mission. 

A successful national reconciliation dialogue will advance 

that departure date. 

RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. 

force presence must be on the table for discussion as the 

national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion will 

increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and 

militia leaders, and thereby increase the possibilities for 

success. 

Violence cannot end unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue 

must involve those who wield power, not simply those who hold 

political office. The United States must try to talk directly to 

Grand Ayatollah Sistani and must consider appointing a highlevel 

American Shia Muslim to serve as an emissary to him. 

The United States must also try to talk directly to Moqtada al- 

Sadr, to militia leaders, and to insurgent leaders. The United 

Nations can help facilitate contacts. 

RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active 

efforts to engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of 

al Qaeda. The United States must find a way to talk to Grand 

Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent 

leaders. 

The very focus on sectarian identity that endangers Iraq also 

presents opportunities to seek broader support for a national 

67 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





reconciliation dialogue. Working with Iraqi leaders, the international 

community and religious leaders can play an important 

role in fostering dialogue and reconciliation across the sectarian 

divide. The United States should actively encourage the 

constructive participation of all who can take part in advancing 

national reconciliation within Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage 

dialogue between sectarian communities, as outlined in 

the New Diplomatic Offensive above. It should press religious 

leaders inside and outside Iraq to speak out on behalf 

of peace and reconciliation. 

Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi government are an 

important incentive in reconciliation talks and they need to be 

generous. Amnesty proposals to once-bitter enemies will be 

difficult for the United States to accept, just as they will be dif- 

ficult for the Iraqis to make. Yet amnesty is an issue to be grappled 

with by the Iraqis, not by Americans. Despite being 

politically unpopular—in the United States as well as in Iraq— 

amnesty is essential if progress is to take place. Iraqi leaders 

need to be certain that they have U.S. support as they move 

forward with this critical element of national reconciliation. 

RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must 

not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the 

legislative branch. 

Militias and National Reconciliation 

The use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and 

necessary to stop militias that act as death squads or use vio- 

68 

t h e i r aq study group report





lence against institutions of the state. However, solving the 

problem of militias requires national reconciliation. 

Dealing with Iraq’s militias will require long-term attention, 

and substantial funding will be needed to disarm, demobilize, 

and reintegrate militia members into civilian society. 

Around the world, this process of transitioning members of irregular 

military forces from civil conflict to new lives once a 

peace settlement takes hold is familiar. The disarmament, demobilization, 

and reintegration of militias depends on national 

reconciliation and on confidence-building measures among the 

parties to that reconciliation. 

Both the United Nations and expert and experienced 

nongovernmental organizations, especially the International 

Organization for Migration, must be on the ground with appropriate 

personnel months before any program to disarm, demobilize, 

and reintegrate militia members begins. Because the 

United States is a party to the conflict, the U.S. military should 

not be involved in implementing such a program. Yet U.S. fi- 

nancial and technical support is crucial. 

RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support 

the presence of neutral international experts as advisors 

to the Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament, demobilization, 

and reintegration. 

RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide 

financial and technical support and establish a single office in 

Iraq to coordinate assistance to the Iraqi government and its 

expert advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize, and 

reintegrate militia members. 

69 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





3. Security and Military Forces 

A Military Strategy for Iraq 

There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, 

can bring about success in Iraq. But there are actions that the 

U.S. and Iraqi governments, working together, can and should 

take to increase the probability of avoiding disaster there, and 

increase the chance of success. 

The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently 

needed national reconciliation program to which it has already 

committed. And it should accelerate assuming responsibility 

for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi 

Army brigades. As the Iraqi Army increases in size and capability, 

the Iraqi government should be able to take real responsibility 

for governance. 

While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the 

United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. 

military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and 

supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, we could 

begin to move combat forces out of Iraq. The primary mission of 

U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi 

army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat 

operations. We should continue to maintain support forces, 

rapid-reaction forces, special operations forces, intelligence 

units, search-and-rescue units, and force protection units. 

While the size and composition of the Iraqi Army is ultimately 

a matter for the Iraqi government to determine, we 

should be firm on the urgent near-term need for significant additional 

trained Army brigades, since this is the key to Iraqis 

taking over full responsibility for their own security, which they 

70 

t h e i r aq study group report





want to do and which we need them to do. It is clear that they 

will still need security assistance from the United States for 

some time to come as they work to achieve political and security 

changes. 

One of the most important elements of our support 

would be the imbedding of substantially more U.S. military 

personnel in all Iraqi Army battalions and brigades, as well as 

within Iraqi companies. U.S. personnel would provide advice, 

combat assistance, and staff assistance. The training of Iraqi 

units by the United States has improved and should continue 

for the coming year. In addition to this training, Iraqi combat 

units need supervised on-the-job training as they move to field 

operations. This on-the-job training could be best done by 

imbedding more U.S. military personnel in Iraqi deployed 

units. The number of imbedded personnel would be based on 

the recommendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but it 

should be large enough to accelerate the development of a real 

combat capability in Iraqi Army units. Such a mission could involve 

10,000 to 20,000 American troops instead of the 3,000 to 

4,000 now in this role. This increase in imbedded troops could 

be carried out without an aggregate increase over time in the 

total number of troops in Iraq by making a corresponding decrease 

in troops assigned to U.S. combat brigades. 

Another mission of the U.S. military would be to assist 

Iraqi deployed brigades with intelligence, transportation, air 

support, and logistics support, as well as providing some key 

equipment. 

A vital mission of the U.S. military would be to maintain 

rapid-reaction teams and special operations teams. These 

teams would be available to undertake strike missions against al 

Qaeda in Iraq when the opportunity arises, as well as for other 

missions considered vital by the U.S. commander in Iraq. 

71 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





The performance of the Iraqi Army could also be signifi- 

cantly improved if it had improved equipment. One source 

could be equipment left behind by departing U.S. units. The 

quickest and most effective way for the Iraqi Army to get the 

bulk of their equipment would be through our Foreign Military 

Sales program, which they have already begun to use. 

While these efforts are building up, and as additional 

Iraqi brigades are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could 

begin to move out of Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject 

to unexpected developments in the security situation on the 

ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection 

could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq 

could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in 

rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, 

equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. 

Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even after the 

United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we 

would maintain a considerable military presence in the region, 

with our still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, 

ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, 

as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces 

would be sufficiently robust to permit the United States, working 

with the Iraqi government, to accomplish four missions: 

• Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order 

to avoid its collapse and the disintegration of the country. 

• Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq 

using special operations teams. 

• Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces. 

72 

t h e i r aq study group report





• Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria 

and Iran. 

Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security 

goals and to our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered 

proposals to make a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000) 

in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course 

because we do not believe that the needed levels are available 

for a sustained deployment. Further, adding more American 

troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security 

problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence is intended 

to be a long-term “occupation.” We could, however, 

support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat 

forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and 

equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines 

that such steps would be effective. 

We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, 

because we believe that so much is at stake. 

We believe that our recommended actions will give the 

Iraqi Army the support it needs to have a reasonable chance to 

take responsibility for Iraq’s security. Given the ongoing deterioration 

in the security situation, it is urgent to move as quickly 

as possible to have that security role taken over by Iraqi security 

forces. 

The United States should not make an open-ended commitment 

to keep large numbers of American troops deployed 

in Iraq for three compelling reasons. 

First, and most importantly, the United States faces other 

security dangers in the world, and a continuing Iraqi commitment 

of American ground forces at present levels will leave no 

reserve available to meet other contingencies. On September 

73 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





7, 2006, General James Jones, our NATO commander, called 

for more troops in Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces 

are fighting a resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban forces. The 

United States should respond positively to that request, and be 

prepared for other security contingencies, including those in 

Iran and North Korea. 

Second, the long-term commitment of American ground 

forces to Iraq at current levels is adversely affecting Army 

readiness, with less than a third of the Army units currently at 

high readiness levels. The Army is unlikely to be able to meet 

the next rotation of troops in Iraq without undesirable changes 

in its deployment practices. The Army is now considering 

breaking its compact with the National Guard and Reserves 

that limits the number of years that these citizen-soldiers can 

be deployed. Behind this short-term strain is the longer-term 

risk that the ground forces will be impaired in ways that will 

take years to reverse. 

And finally, an open-ended commitment of American 

forces would not provide the Iraqi government the incentive it 

needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance 

of quelling sectarian violence. In the absence of such an incentive, 

the Iraqi government might continue to delay taking those 

difficult actions. 

While it is clear that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is 

moderating the violence, there is little evidence that the longterm 

deployment of U.S. troops by itself has led or will lead to 

fundamental improvements in the security situation. It is important 

to recognize that there are no risk-free alternatives 

available to the United States at this time. Reducing our combat 

troop commitments in Iraq, whenever that occurs, undeniably 

creates risks, but leaving those forces tied down in Iraq 

indefinitely creates its own set of security risks. 

74 

t h e i r aq study group report





RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not 

make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of 

American troops deployed in Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it 

clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could 

carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if 

Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s 

other security needs and the future of our military cannot be 

made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government. 

RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the 

training and equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, 

as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006. 

RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must 

change, with the highest priority given to the training, equipping, 

advising, and support mission and to counterterrorism 

operations. 

RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. of- 

ficers and military personnel should be assigned to the 

imbedded teams, and American teams should be present with 

Iraqi units down to the company level. The U.S. military 

should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for 

these officers and personnel. 

RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support 

more and better equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging 

the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign 

Military Sales requests and, as American combat brigades 

75 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment 

for Iraqi forces. 

Restoring the U.S. Military 

We recognize that there are other results of the war in Iraq that 

have great consequence for our nation. One consequence has 

been the stress and uncertainty imposed on our military—the 

most professional and proficient military in history. The United 

States will need its military to protect U.S. security regardless 

of what happens in Iraq. We therefore considered how to limit 

the adverse consequences of the strain imposed on our military 

by the Iraq war. 

U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have 

been stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments 

in Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 dead 

and more than 21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting, 

and accelerated wear on equipment. 

Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of 

disarray, as supplemental funding winds down and reset costs 

become clear. It will be a major challenge to meet ongoing requirements 

for other current and future security threats that 

need to be accommodated together with spending for operations 

and maintenance, reset, personnel, and benefits for active 

duty and retired personnel. Restoring the capability of our military 

forces should be a high priority for the United States at 

this time. 

The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership 

between the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense 

and the uniformed services. Both have long benefited 

from a relationship in which the civilian leadership exercises 

control with the advantage of fully candid professional advice, 

76 

t h e i r aq study group report





and the military serves loyally with the understanding that its 

advice has been heard and valued. That tradition has frayed, 

and civil-military relations need to be repaired. 

RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense 

should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations, 

by creating an environment in which the senior military 

feel free to offer independent advice not only to the 

civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President 

and the National Security Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-

Nichols legislation. 

RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the 

Pentagon leadership should emphasize training and education 

programs for the forces that have returned to the continental 

United States in order to “reset” the force and restore 

the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for global contingencies. 

RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the 

United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds 

to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next 

five years. 

RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation 

with the relevant committees of Congress, should 

assess the full future budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and 

its potential impact on the future readiness of the force, the 

ability to recruit and retain high-quality personnel, needed 

investments in procurement and in research and development, 

and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies involved 

in the stability and reconstruction effort. 

77 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





4. Police and Criminal Justice 

The problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system 

are profound. 

The ethos and training of Iraqi police forces must support 

the mission to “protect and serve” all Iraqis. Today, far too 

many Iraqi police do not embrace that mission, in part because 

of problems in how reforms were organized and implemented 

by the Iraqi and U.S. governments. 

Recommended Iraqi Actions 

Within Iraq, the failure of the police to restore order and prevent 

militia infiltration is due, in part, to the poor organization 

of Iraq’s component police forces: the Iraqi National Police, 

the Iraqi Border Police, and the Iraqi Police Service. 

The Iraqi National Police pursue a mission that is more 

military than domestic in nature—involving commando-style 

operations—and is thus ill-suited to the Ministry of the Interior. 

The more natural home for the National Police is within the 

Ministry of Defense, which should be the authority for counterinsurgency 

operations and heavily armed forces. Though depriving 

the Ministry of the Interior of operational forces, this 

move will place the Iraqi National Police under better and more 

rigorous Iraqi and U.S. supervision and will enable these units 

to better perform their counterinsurgency mission. 

RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police 

should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police 

commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army. 

78 

t h e i r aq study group report





Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged with a role that 

bears little resemblance to ordinary policing, especially in light 

of the current flow of foreign fighters, insurgents, and 

weaponry across Iraq’s borders and the need for joint patrols of 

the border with foreign militaries. Thus the natural home for 

the Border Police is within the Ministry of Defense, which 

should be the authority for controlling Iraq’s borders. 

RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police 

should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which 

would have total responsibility for border control and external 

security. 

The Iraqi Police Service, which operates in the provinces and 

provides local policing, needs to become a true police force. It 

needs legal authority, training, and equipment to control crime 

and protect Iraqi citizens. Accomplishing those goals will not 

be easy, and the presence of American advisors will be required 

to help the Iraqis determine a new role for the police. 

RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should 

be given greater responsibility to conduct criminal investigations 

and should expand its cooperation with other elements 

in the Iraqi judicial system in order to better control crime 

and protect Iraqi civilians. 

In order to more effectively administer the Iraqi Police Service, 

the Ministry of the Interior needs to undertake substantial 

reforms to purge bad elements and highlight best practices. 

Once the ministry begins to function effectively, it can exert 

a positive influence over the provinces and take back some 

79 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





of the authority that was lost to local governments through 

decentralization. To reduce corruption and militia infiltration, 

the Ministry of the Interior should take authority from the local 

governments for the handling of policing funds. Doing so will 

improve accountability and organizational discipline, limit the 

authority of provincial police officials, and identify police offi- 

cers with the central government. 

RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior 

should undergo a process of organizational transformation, 

including efforts to expand the capability and reach of the 

current major crime unit (or Criminal Investigation Division) 

and to exert more authority over local police forces. The 

sole authority to pay police salaries and disburse financial 

support to local police should be transferred to the Ministry 

of the Interior. 

Finally, there is no alternative to bringing the Facilities Protection 

Service under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. 

Simply disbanding these units is not an option, as the 

members will take their weapons and become full-time militiamen 

or insurgents. All should be brought under the authority 

of a reformed Ministry of the Interior. They will need to be vetted, 

retrained, and closely supervised. Those who are no longer 

part of the Facilities Protection Service need to participate in a 

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program (outlined 

above). 

RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior 

should proceed with current efforts to identify, register, and 

control the Facilities Protection Service. 

80 

t h e i r aq study group report





U.S. Actions 

The Iraqi criminal justice system is weak, and the U.S. training 

mission has been hindered by a lack of clarity and capacity. It 

has not always been clear who is in charge of the police training 

mission, and the U.S. military lacks expertise in certain areas 

pertaining to police and the rule of law. The United States has 

been more successful in training the Iraqi Army than it has the 

police. The U.S. Department of Justice has the expertise and 

capacity to carry out the police training mission. The U.S. Department 

of Defense is already bearing too much of the burden 

in Iraq. Meanwhile, the pool of expertise in the United States 

on policing and the rule of law has been underutilized. 

The United States should adjust its training mission in 

Iraq to match the recommended changes in the Iraqi government—

the movement of the National and Border Police to the 

Ministry of Defense and the new emphasis on the Iraqi Police 

Service within the Ministry of the Interior. To reflect the reorganization, 

the Department of Defense would continue to train 

the Iraqi National and Border Police, and the Department of 

Justice would become responsible for training the Iraqi Police 

Service. 

RECOMMENDATION 55: The U.S. Department of Defense 

should continue its mission to train the Iraqi National Police 

and the Iraqi Border Police, which should be placed within 

the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. 

RECOMMENDATION 56: The U.S. Department of Justice 

should direct the training mission of the police forces remaining 

under the Ministry of the Interior. 

81 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training 

teams are imbedded within Iraqi Army units, the current 

practice of imbedding U.S. police trainers should be expanded 

and the numbers of civilian training officers increased so that 

teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi Police Service, including 

local police stations. These trainers should be obtained 

from among experienced civilian police executives and supervisors 

from around the world. These officers would replace 

the military police personnel currently assigned to training 

teams. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided personnel to 

train the Criminal Investigation Division in the Ministry of the 

Interior, which handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded 

a large team within Iraq for counterterrorism activities. 

Building on this experience, the training programs should 

be expanded and should include the development of forensic 

investigation training and facilities that could apply scientific 

and technical investigative methods to counterterrorism as well 

as to ordinary criminal activity. 

RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative 

and forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include 

coverage of terrorism as well as criminal activity. 

One of the major deficiencies of the Iraqi Police Service is its 

lack of equipment, particularly in the area of communications 

and motor transport. 

RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should 

provide funds to expand and upgrade communications 

equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service. 

82 

t h e i r aq study group report





The Department of Justice is also better suited than the Department 

of Defense to carry out the mission of reforming 

Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior and Iraq’s judicial system. Iraq 

needs more than training for cops on the beat: it needs courts, 

trained prosecutors and investigators, and the ability to protect 

Iraqi judicial officials. 

RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice 

should lead the work of organizational transformation in the 

Ministry of the Interior. This approach must involve Iraqi of- 

ficials, starting at senior levels and moving down, to create a 

strategic plan and work out standard administrative procedures, 

codes of conduct, and operational measures that 

Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in 

partnership. 

RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department 

of Justice to establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors, 

and investigators; and to create institutions and practices to 

fight corruption must be strongly supported and funded. New 

and refurbished courthouses with improved physical security, 

secure housing for judges and judicial staff, witness protection 

facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts 

of a secure and functioning system of justice. 

5. The Oil Sector 

Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the 

Iraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help 

Iraq maximize its capability. 

Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore 

oil production from existing fields to 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels a 

83 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





day over a three- to five-year period, depending on evolving 

conditions in key reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow, 

oil production would decline unless current problems in 

the oil sector were addressed. 

Short Term 

RECOMMENDATION 62: 

• As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide 

technical assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare 

a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and 

local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework 

for investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract 

investment. 

• The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government 

to accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well 

work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase production, 

but the United States should no longer fund such 

infrastructure projects. 

• The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military 

and with private security forces to protect oil infrastructure 

and contractors. Protective measures could include a 

program to improve pipeline security by paying local 

tribes solely on the basis of throughput (rather than fixed 

amounts). 

• Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply 

line. This step would immediately improve accountability 

in the oil sector. 

84 

t h e i r aq study group report





• In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the 

U.S. government should press Iraq to continue reducing 

subsidies in the energy sector, instead of providing grant 

assistance. Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products, 

drastic fuel shortages will remain. 

Long Term 

Expanding oil production in Iraq over the long term will require 

creating corporate structures, establishing management 

systems, and installing competent managers to plan and oversee 

an ambitious list of major oil-field investment projects. 

To improve oil-sector performance, the Study Group puts 

forward the following recommendations. 

RECOMMENDATION 63: 

• The United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s 

oil sector by the international community and by international 

energy companies. 

• The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize 

the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order 

to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability. 

• To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge 

the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes, 

and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers 

can track exports and export revenues. 

• The United States should support the World Bank’s efforts 

to ensure that best practices are used in contracting. This 

85 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





support involves providing Iraqi officials with contracting 

templates and training them in contracting, auditing, and 

reviewing audits. 

• The United States should provide technical assistance to 

the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving 

the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting 

and auditing, and updating professional training programs 

for management and technical personnel. 

6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction 

Assistance 

Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the 

heart of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and capacity building demands 

additional U.S. resources. 

Progress in providing essential government services is 

necessary to sustain any progress on the political or security 

front. The period of large U.S.-funded reconstruction projects 

is over, yet the Iraqi government is still in great need of technical 

assistance and advice to build the capacity of its institutions. 

The Iraqi government needs help with all aspects of its operations, 

including improved procedures, greater delegation of authority, 

and better internal controls. The strong emphasis on 

building capable central ministries must be accompanied by efforts 

to develop functioning, effective provincial government 

institutions with local citizen participation. 

Job creation is also essential. There is no substitute for 

private-sector job generation, but the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program is a necessary transitional mechanism 

until security and the economic climate improve. It provides 

immediate economic assistance for trash pickup, water, sewers, 

86 

t h e i r aq study group report





and electricity in conjunction with clear, hold, and build operations, 

and it should be funded generously. A total of $753 million 

was appropriated for this program in FY 2006. 

RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic assistance should 

be increased to a level of $5 billion per year rather than being 

permitted to decline. The President needs to ask for the necessary 

resources and must work hard to win the support of 

Congress. Capacity building and job creation, including reliance 

on the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 

should be U.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be provided 

on a nonsectarian basis. 

The New Diplomatic Offensive can help draw in more international 

partners to assist with the reconstruction mission. The 

United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization 

for Economic Cooperation and Development, and 

some Arab League members need to become hands-on participants 

in Iraq’s reconstruction. 

RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction 

efforts in Iraq should be greater involvement by and 

with international partners, who should do more than just 

contribute money. They should also actively participate in 

the design and construction of projects. 

The number of refugees and internally displaced persons 

within Iraq is increasing dramatically. If this situation is not 

addressed, Iraq and the region could be further destabilized, 

and the humanitarian suffering could be severe. Funding for 

international relief efforts is insufficient, and should be increased. 

87 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take 

the lead in funding assistance requests from the United Nations 

High Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian 

agencies. 

Coordination of Economic and 

Reconstruction Assistance 

A lack of coordination by senior management in Washington 

still hampers U.S. contributions to Iraq’s reconstruction. 

Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in 

short supply. No single official is assigned responsibility or held 

accountable for the overall reconstruction effort. Representatives 

of key foreign partners involved in reconstruction have 

also spoken to us directly and specifically about the need for a 

point of contact that can coordinate their efforts with the U.S. 

government. 

A failure to improve coordination will result in agencies 

continuing to follow conflicting strategies, wasting taxpayer 

dollars on duplicative and uncoordinated efforts. This waste 

will further undermine public confidence in U.S. policy in Iraq. 

A Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq is 

required. He or she should report to the President, be given a 

staff and funding, and chair a National Security Council interagency 

group consisting of senior principals at the undersecretary 

level from all relevant U.S. government departments and 

agencies. The Senior Advisor’s responsibility must be to bring 

unity of effort to the policy, budget, and implementation of 

economic reconstruction programs in Iraq. The Senior Advisor 

must act as the principal point of contact with U.S. partners in 

the overall reconstruction effort. 

88 

t h e i r aq study group report





He or she must have close and constant interaction with 

senior U.S. officials and military commanders in Iraq, especially 

the Director of the Iraq Reconstruction and Management 

Office, so that the realities on the ground are brought 

directly and fully into the policy-making process. In order to 

maximize the effectiveness of assistance, all involved must be 

on the same page at all times. 

RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a 

Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. 

Improving the Effectiveness of 

Assistance Programs 

Congress should work with the administration to improve its 

ability to implement assistance programs in Iraq quickly, flexibly, 

and effectively. 

As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq 

should have the authority to fund quick-disbursing projects to 

promote national reconciliation, as well as to rescind funding 

from programs and projects in which the government of Iraq is 

not demonstrating effective partnership. These are important 

tools to improve performance and accountability—as is the 

work of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq 

should have the authority to spend significant funds through a 

program structured along the lines of the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program, and should have the authority to rescind 

funding from programs and projects in which the 

government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership. 

89 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed 

for the duration of assistance programs in Iraq. 

U.S. security assistance programs in Iraq are slowed considerably 

by the differing requirements of State and Defense Department 

programs and of their respective congressional 

oversight committees. Since Iraqi forces must be trained and 

equipped, streamlining the provision of training and equipment 

to Iraq is critical. Security assistance should be delivered 

promptly, within weeks of a decision to provide it. 

RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance 

program for Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency 

cooperation, should be authorized and implemented. 

The United States also needs to break down barriers that discourage 

U.S. partnerships with international donors and Iraqi 

participants to promote reconstruction. The ability of the 

United States to form such partnerships will encourage greater 

international participation in Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds 

with those from international donors and Iraqi participants 

on behalf of assistance projects should be provided. 

7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, 

and Review 

The public interest is not well served by the government’s 

preparation, presentation, and review of the budget for the war 

in Iraq. 

90 

t h e i r aq study group report





First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal 

budget request but in requests for emergency supplemental 

appropriations. This means that funding requests are drawn 

up outside the normal budget process, are not offset by budgetary 

reductions elsewhere, and move quickly to the White 

House with minimal scrutiny. Bypassing the normal review 

erodes budget discipline and accountability. 

Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in 

a confusing manner, making it difficult for both the general 

public and members of Congress to understand the request or 

to differentiate it from counterterrorism operations around the 

world or operations in Afghanistan. Detailed analyses by budget 

experts are needed to answer what should be a simple question: 

“How much money is the President requesting for the war 

in Iraq?” 

Finally, circumvention of the budget process by the executive 

branch erodes oversight and review by Congress. The authorizing 

committees (including the House and Senate Armed 

Services committees) spend the better part of a year reviewing 

the President’s annual budget request. When the President 

submits an emergency supplemental request, the authorizing 

committees are bypassed. The request goes directly to the appropriations 

committees, and they are pressured by the need to 

act quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds. 

The result is a spending bill that passes Congress with perfunctory 

review. Even worse, the must-pass appropriations bill becomes 

loaded with special spending projects that would not 

survive the normal review process. 

RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should 

be included in the President’s annual budget request, starting 

in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal 

91 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





budget process should not be circumvented. Funding requests 

for the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to 

Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out 

its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for 

the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight. 

8. U.S. Personnel 

The United States can take several steps to ensure that it has 

personnel with the right skills serving in Iraq. 

All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped 

by Americans’ lack of language and cultural understanding. 

Our embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six 

of whom are at the level of fluency. In a conflict that demands 

effective and efficient communication with Iraqis, we are often 

at a disadvantage. There are still far too few Arab language– 

proficient military and civilian officers in Iraq, to the detriment 

of the U.S. mission. 

Civilian agencies also have little experience with complex 

overseas interventions to restore and maintain order—stability 

operations—outside of the normal embassy setting. The nature 

of the mission in Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous, and the 

United States has had great difficulty filling civilian assignments 

in Iraq with sufficient numbers of properly trained personnel 

at the appropriate rank. 

RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary 

of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence 

should accord the highest possible priority to professional 

language proficiency and cultural training, in general and 

specifically for U.S. officers and personnel about to be assigned 

to Iraq. 

92 

t h e i r aq study group report





RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough 

civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies 

must fill those positions with directed assignments. Steps 

should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships 

posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar 

to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in 

Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United 

States government needs to improve how its constituent 

agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development, 

Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others—

respond to a complex stability operation like that 

represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and 

the previous decade’s operations in the Balkans. They need to 

train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, 

following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has 

proved so successful in the U.S. armed services. 

RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should 

train personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with a 

complex stability operation outside of the traditional embassy 

setting. It should establish a Foreign Service Reserve 

Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity 

for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including 

Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar 

technical assistance capabilities. 

9. Intelligence 

While the United States has been able to acquire good and 

sometimes superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our 

93 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





government still does not understand very well either the insurgency 

in Iraq or the role of the militias. 

A senior commander told us that human intelligence in 

Iraq has improved from 10 percent to 30 percent. Clearly, U.S. 

intelligence agencies can and must do better. As mentioned 

above, an essential part of better intelligence must be improved 

language and cultural skills. As an intelligence analyst 

told us, “We rely too much on others to bring information to us, 

and too often don’t understand what is reported back because 

we do not understand the context of what we are told.” 

The Defense Department and the intelligence community 

have not invested sufficient people and resources to understand 

the political and military threat to American men and 

women in the armed forces. Congress has appropriated almost 

$2 billion this year for countermeasures to protect our troops in 

Iraq against improvised explosive devices, but the administration 

has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources 

in trying to understand the people who fabricate, plant, 

and explode those devices. 

We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the 

job at the Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two 

years’ experience in analyzing the insurgency. Capable analysts 

are rotated to new assignments, and on-the-job training begins 

anew. Agencies must have a better personnel system to keep analytic 

expertise focused on the insurgency. They are not doing 

enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a 

national and provincial level. The analytic community’s knowledge 

of the organization, leadership, financing, and operations 

of militias, as well as their relationship to government security 

forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to know. 

In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence 

in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter 

94 

t h e i r aq study group report





to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an 

Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine 

the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not 

make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar 

attack that doesn’t hurt U.S. personnel doesn’t count. For 

example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant 

acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports 

for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. 

Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically 

collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy 

goals. 

RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence 

and the Secretary of Defense should devote signifi- 

cantly greater analytic resources to the task of understanding 

the threats and sources of violence in Iraq. 

RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence 

and the Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate 

changes in the collection of data about violence and 

the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate 

picture of events on the ground. 

Recommended Iraqi Actions 

The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability, 

initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take 

full responsibility for this intelligence function. 

To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the 

CIA should increase its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence 

personnel. The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi offi- 

cials, a counterterrorism intelligence center for the all-source 

95 

The Way Forward—A New Approach





fusion of information on the various sources of terrorism within 

Iraq. This center would analyze data concerning the individuals, 

organizations, networks, and support groups involved in 

terrorism within Iraq. It would also facilitate intelligence-led 

police and military actions against them. 

RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional 

personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence 

service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence 

center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism 

efforts. 

96 

t h e i r aq study group report





Appendices









99 

N 

Red Sea 

EGYPT

ISRAEL 

Cairo 

SUDAN 

Jerusalem 

Kabul 

Beirut 

Ankara 

LEBANON 

SYRIA 

Damascus 

Amman 

JORDAN 

SAUDI ARABIA 

Kuwait City 

KUWAIT 

Baghdad 

I R AQ 

TURKEY 

Tehran 

IRAN 

Riyadh 

UNITED ARAB 

EMIRATES 

OMAN 

PAKISTAN 

AFGHANISTAN 

TURKMENISTAN 

Caspian 

Sea 

Mediterranean 

Sea 

A ra b i a n 

Sea 

Persia 

n 

Gu 

lf 

Tigris R. 

Euphrates 

R. 

Overview Map 

of the Region 

0 

0 

1 0 0 

1 0 0 

2 0 0 

2 0 0 

STATUTE MILES 

KILOMETERS





100 

Kuwait 

City 

BAGHDAD 

Basrah 

Safwan 

Faw 

Peninsula 

Umm 

Qasr 

Nasiriyah 

Tallil 

Samawah 

Najaf 

Diwaniyah 

Hillah 

Karbala 

Ramadi 

Hit 

Samarra 

Tikrit 

Baqubah 

Fallujah 

Airport 

Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah 

Halabjah 

Irbil 

Mosul 

Kut 

Amarah 

Qurnah 

Jalibah 

Numaniyah 

E 

u 

phrat 

es 

R 

. 

Ti 

gris R. 

Tig 

ris R 

. 

SYRIA 

TURKEY 

IRAN 

SAUDI 

ARABIA 

KUWA I T 

I R A Q

Hwy. 27 

Hwy. 7 

Hwy. 1 

Hwy. 1 

Hwy. 6 

Hwy. 8 

Hwy. 17 

Kurdish-controlled 

Area 

Euphrates R. 

N 

Overview Map of Iraq 

0 

0 

1 0 0 

1 0 0 

2 0 0 

2 0 0 

STATUTE MILES 

KILOMETERS 

Major oilfield Kurdish 

region 

Major road Marsh





101 

AL ANBAR 

NINAWA

DAHUK

ARBIL 

AT 

TA’MIM 

SALAH 

AD DIN 

DIYALA

WASIT 

AN NAJAF 

AL MUTHANNA AL 

BASRAH 

MAYSAN 

BABIL 

DHI 

QAR 

1 

2 

4 

3 I R A Q 

S Y R I A 

S A U D I A R A B I A 

T U R K E Y 

I R A N 

KUWA I T 

N 

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS 

Iraq has 18 provinces 

(muhafazat, singular muhafazah). 

0 

0 

1 0 0 

1 0 0 

2 0 0 

2 0 0 

STATUTE MILES 

KILOMETERS 

Province capital 

1. As Sulaymaniyah 

2. Baghdad 

3. Karbala 

4. Al Qadisiyah





102 

BAGHDAD 

Basrah 

Nasiriyah 

Najaf 

Diwaniyah 

Hillah 

Karbala 

Ramadi 

Samarra 

Tikrit 

Sulaymaniyah 

Halabjah 

Arbil 

Mosul 

Al Kut 

Amarah 

Mandali 

Tig 

ris R. 

SYRIA 

TURKEY 

IRAN 

SAUDI 

ARABIA 

KUWA I T 

I R A Q 

Eu 

phrates 

R. 

Kirkuk 

Rawanduz Tall Kayt 

Dahuk 

Zakhu 

Sinjar 

Ar Rutbah 

N 

Distribution of Religious and Ethnic Groups 

Majority Groups Minority Groups 

0 

0 

1 0 0 

1 0 0 

2 0 0 

2 0 0 

STATUTE MILES 

KILOMETERS 

Sunni Arab 

Sunni Kurd 

Shia Arab 

Sunni Arab and 

Sunni Kurd 

Sunni Arab and 

Shia Arab 

Yezidi 

Turkoman 

Iranian 

Christian 

Mandaean 

Jewish 

Christians represent different sects and ethnic groups. 

Yezidis, Mandaeans, and Jews, although shown as religious 

groups, may also be considered as separate ethnic entities.





Letter from the Sponsoring 

Organizations 

The initiative for a bipartisan, independent, forward-looking 

“fresh-eyes” assessment of Iraq emerged from conversations 

U.S. House Appropriations Committee Member Frank Wolf 

had with us. In late 2005, Congressman Wolf asked the United 

States Institute of Peace, a bipartisan federal entity, to facilitate 

the assessment, in collaboration with the James A. Baker III 

Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, the Center for the 

Study of the Presidency, and the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. 

Interested members of Congress, in consultation with the 

sponsoring organizations and the administration, agreed that 

former Republican U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III 

and former Democratic Congressman Lee H. Hamilton had 

the breadth of knowledge of foreign affairs required to co-chair 

this bipartisan effort. The co-chairs subsequently selected the 

other members of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, all senior 

individuals with distinguished records of public service. Democrats 

included former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, 

former Governor and U.S. Senator Charles S. Robb, former 

Congressman and White House chief of staff Leon E. Panetta, 

103





and Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., advisor to President Bill Clinton. 

Republicans included former Associate Justice to the U.S. Supreme 

Court Sandra Day O’Connor, former U.S. Senator Alan 

K. Simpson, former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, and 

former Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger. Former 

CIA Director Robert Gates was an active member for a period 

of months until his nomination as Secretary of Defense. 

The Iraq Study Group was launched on March 15, 2006, 

in a Capitol Hill meeting hosted by U.S. Senator John Warner 

and attended by congressional leaders from both sides of the 

aisle. 

To support the Study Group, the sponsoring organizations 

created four expert working groups consisting of 44 leading 

foreign policy analysts and specialists on Iraq. The working 

groups, led by staff of the United States Institute of Peace, 

focused on the Strategic Environment, Military and Security 

Issues, Political Development, and the Economy and Reconstruction. 

Every effort was made to ensure the participation of 

experts across a wide span of the political spectrum. Additionally, 

a panel of retired military officers was consulted. 

We are grateful to all those who have assisted the Study 

Group, especially the supporting experts and staff. Our thanks 

go to Daniel P. Serwer of the Institute of Peace, who served as 

executive director; Christopher Kojm, advisor to the Study 

Group; John Williams, Policy Assistant to Mr. Baker; and Ben 

Rhodes, Special Assistant to Mr. Hamilton. 

Richard H. Solomon, President 

United States Institute of Peace 

Edward P. Djerejian, Founding Director 

James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 

Rice University 

104 

L e t t e r f r o m t h e S p o n s o r i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n s





David M. Abshire, President 

Center for the Study of the Presidency 

John J. Hamre, President 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

105 

L e t t e r f r o m t h e S p o n s o r i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n s





Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions 

March 15, 2006 

April 11–12, 2006 

May 18–19, 2005 

June 13–14, 2006 

August 2–3, 2006 

August 30–September 4, 2006 (Trip to Baghdad) 

September 18–19, 2006 

November 13–14, 2006 

November 27–29, 2006 

106





Iraq Study Group Consultations 

(* denotes a meeting that took place in Iraq) 

Iraqi Officials and Representatives 

* Jalal Talabani—President 

*Tariq al-Hashimi—Vice President 

*Adil Abd al-Mahdi—Vice President 

*Nouri Kamal al-Maliki—Prime Minister 

*Salaam al-Zawbai—Deputy Prime Minister 

*Barham Salih—Deputy Prime Minister 

*Mahmoud al-Mashhadani—Speaker of the Parliament 

*Mowaffak al-Rubaie—National Security Advisor 

*Jawad Kadem al-Bolani—Minister of Interior 

*Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi—Minister of Defense 

*Hoshyar Zebari—Minister of Foreign Affairs 

*Bayan Jabr—Minister of Finance 

* Hussein al-Shahristani—Minster of Oil 

*Karim Waheed—Minister of Electricity 

*Akram al-Hakim—Minister of State for National 

Reconciliation Affairs 

* Mithal al-Alusi—Member, High Commission on National 

Reconciliation 

107





*Ayad Jamal al-Din—Member, High Commission on National 

Reconciliation 

* Ali Khalifa al-Duleimi—Member, High Commission on 

National Reconciliation 

*Sami al-Ma’ajoon—Member, High Commission on National 

Reconciliation 

*Muhammad Ahmed Mahmoud—Member, Commission on 

National Reconciliation 

*Wijdan Mikhael—Member, High Commission on National 

Reconciliation 

Lt. General Nasir Abadi—Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi 

Joint Forces 

*Adnan al-Dulaimi—Head of the Tawafuq list 

Ali Allawi—Former Minister of Finance 

* Sheik Najeh al-Fetlawi—representative of Moqtada al-Sadr 

*Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim—Shia Coalition Leader 

*Sheik Maher al-Hamraa—Ayat Allah Said Sussein Al 

Sadar 

*Hajim al-Hassani—Member of the Parliament on the Iraqiya 

list 

*Hunain Mahmood Ahmed Al-Kaddo—President of the Iraqi 

Minorities Council 

* Abid al-Gufhoor Abid al-Razaq al-Kaisi—Dean of the Islamic 

University of the Imam Al-Atham 

*Ali Neema Mohammed Aifan al-Mahawili—Rafiday Al-Iraq 

Al-Jaded Foundation 

*Saleh al-Mutlaq—Leader of the Iraqi Front for National 

Dialogue 

*Ayyad al-Sammara’l—Member of the Parliament 

*Yonadim Kenna—Member of the Parliament and Secretary 

General of Assyrian Movement 

*Shahla Wali Mohammed—Iraqi Counterpart International 

108 

I r a q S t u d y G r o u p C o n s u l t a t i o n s





*Hamid Majid Musa—Secretary of the Iraqi Communist 

Party 

*Raid Khyutab Muhemeed—Humanitarian, Cultural, and 

Social Foundation 

Sinan Shabibi—Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq 

Samir Shakir M. Sumaidaie—Ambassador of Iraq to the 

United States 

Current U.S. Administration Officials 

Senior Administration Officials 

George W. Bush—President 

Richard B. Cheney—Vice President 

Condoleezza Rice—Secretary of State 

Donald H. Rumsfeld—Secretary of Defense 

Stephen J. Hadley—National Security Advisor 

Joshua B. Bolten—White House Chief of Staff 

Department of Defense/Military 

civilian: 

Gordon England—Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Stephen Cambone—Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

Eric Edelman—Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

military: 

General Peter Pace—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani—Vice-Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff 

General John Abizaid—Commander, United States Central 

Command 

109 

I r a q S t u d y G r o u p C o n s u l t a t i o n s





*General George W. Casey, Jr.—Commanding General, 

Multi-National Forces–Iraq 

Lt. General James T. Conway—Director of Operations, J-3, 

on the Joint Staff 

* Lt. General Peter Chiarelli—Commander, Multi-National 

Forces–Iraq 

Lt. General David H. Petraeus—Commanding General, U.S. 

Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth 

*Lt. General Martin Dempsey—Commander Multi-National 

Security Transition Command–Iraq 

*Maj. General Joseph Peterson—Coalition Police Assistance 

Training Team 

*Maj. General Richard Zilmer—Commander, 1st Marine 

Expeditionary Force 

Colonel Derek Harvey—Senior Intelligence Officer for Iraq, 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Lt. Colonel Richard Bowyer—National War College (recently 

served in Iraq) 

Lt. Colonel Justin Gubler—National War College (recently 

served in Iraq) 

Lt. Colonel David Haight—National War College (recently 

served in Iraq) 

Lt. Colonel Russell Smith—National War College (recently 

served in Iraq) 

Department of State/Civilian Embassy Personnel 

R. Nicholas Burns—Under Secretary of State for Political 

Affairs 

Philip Zelikow—Counselor to the Department of State 

C. David Welch—Assistant Secretary of State for Near 

Eastern Affairs 

110 

I r a q S t u d y G r o u p C o n s u l t a t i o n s





James Jeffrey—Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and 

Coordinator for Iraq Policy 

David Satterfield—Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and 

Coordinator for Iraq Policy 

Zalmay Khalilzad—U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

*Dan Speckhard—Charge D’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Iraq 

*Joseph Saloom—Director, Iraq Reconstruction and 

Management Office 

*Hilda Arellano—U.S. Agency for International Development 

Director in Iraq 

*Terrance Kelly—Director, Office of Strategic Plans and 

Assessments 

*Randall Bennett—Regional Security Officer of the U.S. 

Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq 

Intelligence Community 

John D. Negroponte—Director of National Intelligence 

General Michael V. Hayden—Director, Central Intelligence 

Agency 

Thomas Fingar—Deputy Director of National Intelligence for 

Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council 

John Sherman—Deputy National Intelligence Officer for 

Military Issues 

Steve Ward—Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the 

Middle East 

Jeff Wickham—Iraq Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency 

Other Senior Officials 

David Walker—Comptroller General of the United States 

*Stuart Bowen—Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction 

111 

I r a q S t u d y G r o u p C o n s u l t a t i o n s





Members of Congress 

United States Senate 

Senator William Frist (R-TN)—Majority Leader 

Senators Harry Reid (D-NV)—Minority Leader 

Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY)—Majority Whip 

Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL)—Minority Whip 

Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)—Chair, Foreign Relations 

Committee 

Senators John Warner (R-VA)—Chair, Armed Services 

Committee 

Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE)—Ranking Member, Foreign 

Relations Committee 

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)—Ranking Member, Armed 

Services Committee 

Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)—Ranking Member, Energy 

and Resources Committee 

Senator Kit Bond (R-MO)—Member, Intelligence 

Committee 

Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)—Member, Armed Services 

Committee 

Senator John Kerry (D-MA)—Member, Foreign Relations 

Committee 

Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)—Member, Armed 

Services Committee 

Senator John McCain (R-AZ)—Member, Armed Services 

Committee 

Senator Jack Reed (D-RI)—Member, Armed Services 

Committee 

112 

I r a q S t u d y G r o u p C o n s u l t a t i o n s





United States House of Representatives 

Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)—Minority Leader 

Representative Tom Davis (R-VA)—Chair, Government 

Reform Committee 

Representative Jane Harman (D-CA)—Ranking Member, 

Intelligence Committee 

Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO)—Ranking Member, 

Armed Services Committee 

Representative John Murtha (D-PA)—Ranking Member, 

Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense 

Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN)—Member, Armed 

Services Committee 

Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX)—Member, 

International Relations Committee 

Representative Alan Mollohan (D-WV)—Member, 

Appropriations Committee 

Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT)—Member, 

Government Reform Committee 

Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA)—Member, Appropriations 

Committee 

Foreign Officials 

Sheikh Salem al-Abdullah al-Sabah—Ambassador of Kuwait 

to the United States 

David Abramovich—Director General of the Israeli Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs 

Michael Ambuhl—Secretary of State of Switzerland 

Kofi Annan—Secretary-General of the United Nations 

*Dominic Asquith—British Ambassador to Iraq 

Tony Blair—Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 

113 

I r a q S t u d y G r o u p C o n s u l t a t i o n s





Prince Turki al-Faisal—Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the 

United States 

Nabil Fahmy—Ambassador of Egypt to the United States 

Karim Kawar—Ambassador of Jordan to the United States 

Nasser bin Hamad al-Khalifa—Ambassador of Qatar to the 

United States 

*Mukhtar Lamani—Arab League envoy to Iraq 

Sir David Manning—British Ambassador to the United 

States 

Imad Moustapha—Ambassador of Syria to the United States 

Walid Muallem—Foreign Minister of Syria 

Romano Prodi—Prime Minister of Italy 

*Ashraf Qazi—Special Representative of the UN Secretary- 

General for Iraq 

Anders Fogh Rasmussen—Prime Minister of Denmark 

Nabi Sensoy—Ambassador of Turkey to the United States 

Ephraim Sneh—Deputy Minister of Defense of the State of 

Israel 

Javad Zarif—Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations 

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayad—Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 

United Arab Emirates 

Former Officials and Experts 

William J. Clinton—former President of the United States 

Walter Mondale—former Vice President of the United States 

Madeleine K. Albright—former United States Secretary of 

State 

Warren Christopher—former United States Secretary of State 

Henry Kissinger—former United States Secretary of State 

Colin Powell—former United States Secretary of State 

George P. Schultz—former United States Secretary of State 

114 

I r a q S t u d y G r o u p C o n s u l t a t i o n s





Samuel R. Berger—former United States National Security 

Advisor 

Zbigniew Brzezinski—former United States National Security 

Advisor 

Anthony Lake—former United States National Security 

Advisor 

General Brent Scowcroft—former United States National 

Security Advisor 

General Eric Shinseki—former Chief of Staff of the United 

States Army 

General Anthony Zinni—former Commander, United States 

Central Command 

General John Keane—former Vice Chief of Staff of the United 

States Army 

Admiral Jim Ellis—former Commander of United States 

Strategic Command 

General Joe Ralston—former Supreme Allied Commander of 

NATO 

Lt. General Roger C. Schultz—former Director of the United 

States Army National Guard 

Douglas Feith—former United States Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy 

Mark Danner—The New York Review of Books 

Larry Diamond—Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 

Stanford University 

Thomas Friedman—New York Times 

Leslie Gelb—President Emeritus, Council on Foreign 

Relations 

Richard Hill—Director, Office of Strategic Initiatives and 

Analysis, CHF International 

Richard C. Holbrooke—former Ambassador of the United 

States to the United Nations 

115 

I r a q S t u d y G r o u p C o n s u l t a t i o n s





Martin S. Indyk—Director, Saban Center for Middle East 

Policy, The Brookings Institution 

Ronald Johnson—Executive Vice President for International 

Development, RTI International 

Frederick Kagan—The American Enterprise Institute 

Arthur Keys, Jr.—President and CEO, International Relief and 

Development 

William Kristol—The Weekly Standard 

*Guy Laboa—Kellogg, Brown & Root 

Nancy Lindborg—President, Mercy Corps 

Michael O’Hanlon—Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, 

The Brookings Institution 

George Packer—The New Yorker 

Carlos Pascual—Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy 

Studies, The Brookings Institution 

Robert Perito—Senior Program Officer, United States Institute 

of Peace 

* Col. Jack Petri, USA (Ret.)—advisor to the Iraqi Ministry 

of Interior 

Kenneth Pollack—Director of Research, Saban Center for 

Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution 

Thomas Ricks—The Washington Post 

Zainab Salbi—Founder and CEO, Women for Women 

International 

Matt Sherman—former Deputy Senior Advisor and Director 

of Policy, Iraqi Ministry of Interior 

Strobe Talbott—President, The Brookings Institution 

Rabih Torbay—Vice President for International Operations, 

International Medical Corps 

George Will—The Washington Post 

116 

I r a q S t u d y G r o u p C o n s u l t a t i o n s





Expert Working Groups and 

Military Senior Advisor Panel 

Economy and Reconstruction 

Gary Matthews, USIP Secretariat 

Director, Task Force on the United Nations and Special 

Projects, United States Institute of Peace 

Raad Alkadiri 

Director, Country Strategies Group, PFC Energy 

Frederick D. Barton 

Senior Adviser and Co-Director, International Security 

Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies 

Jay Collins 

Chief Executive Officer, Public Sector Group, Citigroup, Inc. 

Jock P. Covey 

Senior Vice President, External Affairs, Corporate Security 

and Sustainability Services, Bechtel Corporation 

117





Keith Crane 

Senior Economist, RAND Corporation 

Amy Myers Jaffe 

Associate Director for Energy Studies, James A. Baker III 

Institute for Public Policy, Rice University 

K. Riva Levinson 

Managing Director, BKSH & Associates 

David A. Lipton 

Managing Director and Head of Global Country Risk 

Management, Citigroup, Inc 

Michael E. O’Hanlon 

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings 

Institution 

James A. Placke 

Senior Associate, Cambridge Energy Research Associates 

James A. Schear 

Director of Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

National Defense University 

Military and Security 

Paul Hughes, USIP Secretariat 

Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and 

Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace 

118 

Expert Working Groups





Hans A. Binnendijk 

Director & Theodore Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology 

& National Security Policy, National Defense University 

James Carafano 

Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, 

Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, 

The Heritage Foundation 

Michael Eisenstadt 

Director, Military & Security Program, The Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy 

Michèle A. Flournoy 

Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for 

Strategic & International Studies 

Bruce Hoffman 

Professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School 

of Foreign Service, Georgetown University 

Clifford May 

President, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies 

Robert M. Perito 

Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and 

Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace 

Kalev I. Sepp 

Assistant Professor, Department of Defense Analysis, Center 

on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School 

119 

Expert Working Groups





John F. Sigler 

Adjunct Distinguished Professor, Near East South Asia Center 

for Strategic Studies, National Defense University 

W. Andrew Terrill 

Research Professor, National Security Affairs, Strategic 

Studies Institute 

Jeffrey A. White 

Berrie Defense Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy 

Political Development 

Daniel P. Serwer, USIP Secretariat 

Vice President, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability 

Operations, United States Institute of Peace 

Raymond H. Close 

Freelance Analyst and Commentator on Middle East Politics 

Larry Diamond 

Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 

and Co-Editor, Journal of Democracy 

Andrew P. N. Erdmann 

Former Director for Iran, Iraq and Strategic Planning, 

National Security Council 

Reuel Marc Gerecht 

Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute 

120 

Expert Working Groups





David L. Mack 

Vice President, The Middle East Institute 

Phebe A. Marr 

Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace 

Hassan Mneimneh 

Director, Documentation Program, The Iraq Memory 

Foundation 

Augustus Richard Norton 

Professor of International Relations and Anthropology, 

Department of International Relations, Boston University 

Marina S. Ottaway 

Senior Associate, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Judy Van Rest 

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute 

Judith S. Yaphe 

Distinguished Research Fellow for the Middle East, 

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 

University 

Strategic Environment 

Paul Stares, USIP Secretariat 

Vice President, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, 

United States Institute of Peace 

121 

Expert Working Groups





Jon B. Alterman 

Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic & 

International Studies 

Steven A. Cook 

Douglas Dillon Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations 

James F. Dobbins 

Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, 

RAND Corporation 

Hillel Fradkin 

Director, Center for Islam, Democracy and the Future of the 

Muslim World, Hudson Institute 

Chas W. Freeman 

Chairman, Projects International and President, Middle East 

Policy Council 

Geoffrey Kemp 

Director, Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon Center 

Daniel C. Kurtzer 

S. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor, Middle East Policy 

Studies, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University 

Ellen Laipson 

President and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson Center 

William B. Quandt 

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Professor of Government and Foreign 

Affairs, University of Virginia, and Nonresident Senior Fellow, 

Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution 

122 

Expert Working Groups





Shibley Telhami 

Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department 

of Government & Politics, University of Maryland, and Nonresident 

Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 

The Brookings Institution 

Wayne White 

Adjunct Scholar, Public Policy Center, Middle East Institute 

Military Senior Advisor Panel 

Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr. 

United States Navy, Retired 

General John M. Keane 

United States Army, Retired 

General Edward C. Meyer 

United States Army, Retired 

General Joseph W. Ralston 

United States Air Force, Retired 

Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Sr. 

United States Army, Retired 

123 

Expert Working Groups





The Iraq Study Group 

James A. Baker, III—Co-Chair 

James A. Baker, III, has served in senior government positions 

under three United States presidents. He served as the nation’s 

61st Secretary of State from January 1989 through August 1992 

under President George H. W. Bush. During his tenure at the 

State Department, Mr. Baker traveled to 90 foreign countries 

as the United States confronted the unprecedented challenges 

and opportunities of the post–Cold War era. Mr. Baker’s reflections 

on those years of revolution, war, and peace—The Politics 

of Diplomacy—was published in 1995. 

Mr. Baker served as the 67th Secretary of the Treasury 

from 1985 to 1988 under President Ronald Reagan. As Treasury 

Secretary, he was also Chairman of the President’s Economic 

Policy Council. From 1981 to 1985, he served as White 

House Chief of Staff to President Reagan. Mr. Baker’s record 

of public service began in 1975 as Under Secretary of Commerce 

to President Gerald Ford. It concluded with his service 

as White House Chief of Staff and Senior Counselor to President 

Bush from August 1992 to January 1993. 

Long active in American presidential politics, Mr. Baker 

led presidential campaigns for Presidents Ford, Reagan, and 

124





Bush over the course of five consecutive presidential elections 

from 1976 to 1992. 

A native Houstonian, Mr. Baker graduated from Princeton 

University in 1952. After two years of active duty as a lieutenant 

in the United States Marine Corps, he entered the 

University of Texas School of Law at Austin. He received his 

J.D. with honors in 1957 and practiced law with the Houston 

firm of Andrews and Kurth from 1957 to 1975. 

Mr. Baker’s memoir—Work Hard, Study . . . and Keep 

Out of Politics! Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected 

Public Life—was published in October 2006. 

Mr. Baker received the Presidential Medal of Freedom 

in 1991 and has been the recipient of many other awards for 

distinguished public service, including Princeton University’s 

Woodrow Wilson Award, the American Institute for Public 

Service’s Jefferson Award, Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy 

School of Government Award, the Hans J. Morgenthau 

Award, the George F. Kennan Award, the Department of the 

Treasury’s Alexander Hamilton Award, the Department of 

State’s Distinguished Service Award, and numerous honorary 

academic degrees. 

Mr. Baker is presently a senior partner in the law firm of 

Baker Botts. He is Honorary Chairman of the James A. Baker 

III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University and serves on 

the board of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. From 1997 

to 2004, Mr. Baker served as the Personal Envoy of United Nations 

Secretary-General Kofi Annan to seek a political solution 

to the conflict over Western Sahara. In 2003, Mr. Baker was appointed 

Special Presidential Envoy for President George W. 

Bush on the issue of Iraqi debt. In 2005, he was co-chair, with 

former President Jimmy Carter, of the Commission on Federal 

Election Reform. Since March 2006, Mr. Baker and former 

125 

The Iraq Study Group





U.S. Congressman Lee H. Hamilton have served as the cochairs 

of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan blue-ribbon panel 

on Iraq. 

Mr. Baker was born in Houston, Texas, in 1930. He and 

his wife, the former Susan Garrett, currently reside in Houston, 

and have eight children and seventeen grandchildren. 

Lee H. Hamilton—Co-Chair 

Lee H. Hamilton became Director of the Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars in January 1999. Previously, Mr. 

Hamilton served for thirty-four years as a United States Congressman 

from Indiana. During his tenure, he served as Chairman 

and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations) and 

chaired the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East from 

the early 1970s until 1993. He was Chairman of the Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence and the Select Committee to 

Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. 

Also a leading figure on economic policy and congressional 

organization, he served as Chair of the Joint Economic 

Committee as well as the Joint Committee on the Organization 

of Congress, and was a member of the House Standards of Of- 

ficial Conduct Committee. In his home state of Indiana, Mr. 

Hamilton worked hard to improve education, job training, and 

infrastructure. Currently, Mr. Hamilton serves as Director of 

the Center on Congress at Indiana University, which seeks to 

educate citizens on the importance of Congress and on how 

Congress operates within our government. 

Mr. Hamilton remains an important and active voice on 

matters of international relations and American national secu- 

126 

The Iraq Study Group





rity. He served as a Commissioner on the United States Commission 

on National Security in the 21st Century (better known 

as the Hart-Rudman Commission), was Co-Chair with former 

Senator Howard Baker of the Baker-Hamilton Commission to 

Investigate Certain Security Issues at Los Alamos, and was Vice- 

Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), which issued 

its report in July 2004. He is currently a member of the President’s 

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the President’s 

Homeland Security Advisory Council, as well as the Director of 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Advisory Board. 

Born in Daytona Beach, Florida, Mr. Hamilton relocated 

with his family to Tennessee and then to Evansville, Indiana. 

Mr. Hamilton is a graduate of DePauw University and the Indiana 

University School of Law, and studied for a year at Goethe 

University in Germany. Before his election to Congress, he 

practiced law in Chicago and in Columbus, Indiana. A former 

high school and college basketball star, he has been inducted 

into the Indiana Basketball Hall of Fame. 

Mr. Hamilton’s distinguished service in government has 

been honored through numerous awards in public service and 

human rights as well as honorary degrees. He is the author of A 

Creative Tension—The Foreign Policy Roles of the President 

and Congress (2002) and How Congress Works and Why You 

Should Care (2004), and the coauthor of Without Precedent: 

The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission (2006). 

Lee and his wife, the former Nancy Ann Nelson, have 

three children—Tracy Lynn Souza, Deborah Hamilton Kremer, 

and Douglas Nelson Hamilton—and five grandchildren: 

Christina, Maria, McLouis and Patricia Souza and Lina Ying 

Kremer. 

127 

The Iraq Study Group





Lawrence S. Eagleburger—Member 

Lawrence S. Eagleburger was sworn in as the 62nd U.S. Secretary 

of State by President George H. W. Bush on December 8, 

1992, and as Deputy Secretary of State on March 20, 1989. 

After his entry into the Foreign Service in 1957, Mr. Eagleburger 

served in the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 

in the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research, in the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, and the U.S. Mission 

to NATO in Belgium. In 1963, after a severe earthquake in 

Macedonia, he led the U.S. government effort to provide medical 

and other assistance. He was then assigned to Washington, 

D.C., where he served on the Secretariat staff and as special assistant 

to Dean Acheson, advisor to the President on Franco- 

NATO issues. In August 1966, he became acting director of the 

Secretariat staff. 

In October 1966, Mr. Eagleburger joined the National 

Security Council staff. In October 1967, he was assigned as 

special assistant to Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. 

In November 1968, he was appointed Dr. Henry 

Kissinger’s assistant, and in January 1969, he became executive 

assistant to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. In September 

1969, he was assigned as political advisor and chief of the political 

section of the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. 

Mr. Eagleburger became Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense in August 1971. Two years later, he became Acting Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. 

The same year he returned to the White House as Deputy Assistant 

to the President for National Security Operations. He 

subsequently followed Dr. Kissinger to the State Department, 

128 

The Iraq Study Group





becoming Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State. In 

1975, he was made Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management. 

In June 1977, Mr. Eagleburger was appointed Ambassador 

to Yugoslavia, and in 1981 he was nominated as Assistant 

Secretary of State for European Affairs. In February 1982, he 

was appointed Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. 

Mr. Eagleburger has received numerous awards, including 

an honorary knighthood from Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II 

(1994); the Distinguished Service Award (1992), the Wilbur J. 

Carr Award (1984), and the Distinguished Honor Award (1984) 

from the Department of State; the Distinguished Civilian Service 

Medal from the Department of Defense (1978); and the President’s 

Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service (1976). 

After retiring from the Department of State in May 1984, 

Mr. Eagleburger was named president of Kissinger Associates, 

Inc. Following his resignation as Secretary of State on January 

19, 1993, he joined the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman 

and Caldwell as Senior Foreign Policy Advisor. He joined the 

boards of Halliburton Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, 

and Universal Corporation. Mr. Eagleburger currently serves 

as Chairman of the International Commission on Holocaust 

Era Insurance Claims. 

He received his B.S. degree in 1952 and his M.S. degree 

in 1957, both from the University of Wisconsin, and served as 

first lieutenant in the U.S. Army from 1952 to 1954. Mr. Eagleburger 

is married to the former Marlene Ann Heinemann. He 

is the father of three sons, Lawrence Scott, Lawrence Andrew, 

and Lawrence Jason. 

129 

The Iraq Study Group





Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.—Member 

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., is a Senior Managing Director of Lazard 

Frères & Co, LLC in New York. He works with a diverse group 

of clients across a broad range of industries. 

Prior to joining Lazard, Mr. Jordan was a Senior Executive 

Partner with the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & 

Feld, LLP, where he remains Senior Counsel. While there Mr. 

Jordan practiced general, corporate, legislative, and international 

law in Washington, D.C. 

Before Akin Gump, Mr. Jordan held the following positions: 

President and Chief Executive Officer of the National 

Urban League, Inc.; Executive Director of the United Negro 

College Fund, Inc.; Director of the Voter Education Project of 

the Southern Regional Council; Attorney-Consultant, U.S. Of- 

fice of Economic Opportunity; Assistant to the Executive Director 

of the Southern Regional Council; Georgia Field Director of 

the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; 

and an attorney in private practice in Arkansas and Georgia. 

Mr. Jordan’s presidential appointments include the President’s 

Advisory Committee for the Points of Light Initiative 

Foundation, the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on 

South Africa, the Advisory Council on Social Security, the Presidential 

Clemency Board, the American Revolution Bicentennial 

Commission, the National Advisory Committee on 

Selective Service, and the Council of the White House Conference 

“To Fulfill These Rights.” In 1992, Mr. Jordan served as 

the Chairman of the Clinton Presidential Transition Team. 

Mr. Jordan’s corporate and other directorships include 

American Express Company; Asbury Automotive Group, Inc.; 

Howard University (Trustee); J. C. Penney Company, Inc.; 

130 

The Iraq Study Group





Lazard Ltd.; Xerox Corporation; and the International Advisory 

Board of Barrick Gold. 

Mr. Jordan is a graduate of DePauw University and the 

Howard University Law School. He holds honorary degrees from 

more than 60 colleges and universities in America. He is a member 

of the bars of Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Georgia, 

and the U.S. Supreme Court. He is a member of the American 

Bar Association, the National Bar Association, the Council on 

Foreign Relations, and the Bilderberg Meetings and he is President 

of the Economic Club of Washington, D.C. Mr. Jordan is the 

author of Vernon Can Read! A Memoir (Public Affairs, 2001). 

Edwin Meese III—Member 

Edwin Meese III holds the Ronald Reagan Chair in Public Policy 

at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington, D.C.–based 

public policy research and education institution. He is also the 

Chairman of Heritage’s Center for Legal and Judicial Studies 

and a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, 

Stanford University. In addition, Meese lectures, writes, and 

consults throughout the United States on a variety of subjects. 

Meese is the author of With Reagan: The Inside Story, 

which was published by Regnery Gateway in June 1992; co-editor 

of Making America Safer, published in 1997 by the Heritage 

Foundation; and coauthor of Leadership, Ethics and 

Policing, published by Prentice Hall in 2004. 

Meese served as the 75th Attorney General of the United 

States from February 1985 to August 1988. As the nation’s chief 

law enforcement officer, he directed the Department of Justice 

and led international efforts to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, 

and organized crime. In 1985 he received Government Executive 

magazine’s annual award for excellence in management. 

131 

The Iraq Study Group





From January 1981 to February 1985, Meese held the position 

of Counsellor to the President, the senior position on the 

White House staff, where he functioned as the President’s 

chief policy advisor. As Attorney General and as Counsellor, 

Meese was a member of the President’s cabinet and the National 

Security Council. He served as Chairman of the Domestic 

Policy Council and of the National Drug Policy Board. 

Meese headed the President-elect’s transition effort following 

the November 1980 election. During the presidential campaign, 

he served as chief of staff and senior issues advisor for 

the Reagan-Bush Committee. 

Formerly, Meese served as Governor Reagan’s executive 

assistant and chief of staff in California from 1969 through 

1974 and as legal affairs secretary from 1967 through 1968. Before 

joining Governor Reagan’s staff in 1967, Meese served as 

deputy district attorney in Alameda County, California. From 

1977 to 1981, Meese was a professor of law at the University of 

San Diego, where he also was Director of the Center for Criminal 

Justice Policy and Management. 

In addition to his background as a lawyer, educator, and 

public official, Meese has been a business executive in the 

aerospace and transportation industry, serving as vice president 

for administration of Rohr Industries, Inc., in Chula Vista, 

California. He left Rohr to return to the practice of law, engaging 

in corporate and general legal work in San Diego 

County. 

Meese is a graduate of Yale University, Class of 1953, and 

holds a law degree from the University of California at Berkeley. 

He is a retired colonel in the United States Army Reserve. 

He is active in numerous civic and educational organizations. 

Meese is married, has two grown children, and resides in 

McLean, Virginia. 

132 

The Iraq Study Group





Sandra Day O’Connor—Member 

Sandra Day O’Connor was nominated by President Reagan as 

Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court on July 7, 

1981, and took the oath of office on September 25. O’Connor 

previously served on the Arizona Court of Appeals (1979–81) 

and as judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court in 

Phoenix, Arizona (1975–79). She was appointed as Arizona state 

senator in 1969 and was subsequently elected to two two-year 

terms from 1969 to 1975. During her tenure, she was Arizona 

Senate Majority Leader and Chairman of the State, County, and 

Municipal Affairs Committee, and she served on the Legislative 

Council, on the Probate Code Commission, and on the Arizona 

Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations. 

From 1965 to 1969, O’Connor was assistant attorney general 

in Arizona. She practiced law at a private firm in Maryvale, 

Arizona, from 1958 to 1960 and prior to that was civilian attorney 

for Quartermaster Market Center in Frankfurt, Germany 

(1954–57), and deputy county attorney in San Mateo County, 

California (1952–53) 

She was previously Chairman of the Arizona Supreme 

Court Committee to Reorganize Lower Courts (1974–75), Vice 

Chairman of the Arizona Select Law Enforcement Review 

Commission (1979–80), and, in Maricopa County, Chairman of 

the Bar Association Lawyer Referral Service (1960–62), the Juvenile 

Detention Home Visiting Board (1963–64), and the Superior 

Court Judges’ Training and Education Committee 

(1977–79) and a member of the Board of Adjustments and Appeals 

(1963–64). 

O’Connor currently serves as Chancellor of the College 

of William and Mary and on the Board of Trustees of the 

133 

The Iraq Study Group





Rockefeller Foundation, the Executive Board of the Central 

European and Eurasian Law Initiative, the Advisory Board of 

the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History, and the 

Advisory Committee of the American Society of International 

Law, Judicial. She is an honorary member of the Advisory 

Committee for the Judiciary Leadership Development Council, 

an honorary chair of America’s 400th Anniversary: Jamestown 

2007, a co-chair of the National Advisory Council of the 

Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, a member of the 

Selection Committee of the Oklahoma City National Memorial 

& Museum, and a member of the Advisory Board of the Stanford 

Center on Ethics. She also serves on several bodies of the 

American Bar Association, including the Museum of Law Executive 

Committee, the Commission on Civic Education and 

Separation of Powers, and the Advisory Commission of the 

Standing Committee on the Law Library of Congress. 

O’Connor previously served as a member of the Anglo- 

American Exchange (1980); the State Bar of Arizona Committees 

on Legal Aid, Public Relations, Lower Court Reorganization, 

and Continuing Legal Education; the National Defense Advisory 

Committee on Women in the Services (1974–76); the Arizona 

State Personnel Commission (1968–69); the Arizona 

Criminal Code Commission (1974–76); and the Cathedral 

Chapter of the Washington National Cathedral (1991–99). 

O’Connor is a member of the American Bar Association, 

the State Bar of Arizona, the State Bar of California, the Maricopa 

County Bar Association, the Arizona Judges’ Association, 

the National Association of Women Judges, and the Arizona 

Women Lawyers’ Association. She holds a B.A. (with Great 

Distinction) and an LL.B. (Order of the Coif) from Stanford 

University, where she was also a member of the board of editors 

of the Stanford Law Review. 

134 

The Iraq Study Group





Leon E. Panetta—Member 

Leon E. Panetta currently co-directs the Leon & Sylvia Panetta 

Institute for Public Policy, a nonpartisan study center for the 

advancement of public policy based at California State University, 

Monterey Bay. He serves as distinguished scholar to the 

chancellor of the California State University system, teaches a 

Master’s in Public Policy course at the Panetta Institute, is a 

presidential professor at Santa Clara University, and created 

the Leon Panetta Lecture Series. 

Panetta first went to Washington in 1966, when he served 

as a legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of 

California. In 1969, he became Special Assistant to the Secretary 

of Health, Education and Welfare and then Director of the 

U.S. Office for Civil Rights. His book Bring Us Together (published 

in 1971) is an account of that experience. In 1970, he 

went to New York City, where he served as Executive Assistant 

to Mayor John Lindsay. Then, in 1971, Panetta returned to California, 

where he practiced law in the Monterey firm of Panetta, 

Thompson & Panetta until he was elected to Congress in 1976. 

Panetta was a U.S. Representative from California’s 16th 

(now 17th) district from 1977 to 1993. He authored the 

Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, the Fair Employment Practices 

Resolution, legislation that established Medicare and 

Medicaid reimbursement for hospice care for the terminally ill, 

and other legislation on a variety of education, health, agriculture, 

and defense issues. 

From 1989 to 1993, Panetta was Chairman of the House 

Committee on the Budget. He also served on that committee 

from 1979 to 1985. He chaired the House Agriculture Committee’s 

Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer 

135 

The Iraq Study Group





Relations and Nutrition; the House Administration Committee’s 

Subcommittee on Personnel and Police; and the Select 

Committee on Hunger’s Task Force on Domestic Hunger. He 

also served as Vice Chairman of the Caucus of Vietnam Era 

Veterans in Congress and as a member of the President’s Commission 

on Foreign Language and International Studies. 

Panetta left Congress in 1993 to become Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget for the incoming Clinton 

administration. Panetta was appointed Chief of Staff to the 

President of the United States on July 17, 1994, and served in 

that position until January 20, 1997. 

In addition, Panetta served a six-year term on the Board 

of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange beginning in 

1997. He currently serves on many public policy and organizational 

boards, including as Chair of the Pew Oceans Commission 

and Co-Chair of the California Council on Base Support 

and Retention. 

Panetta has received many awards and honors, including 

the Smithsonian Paul Peck Award for Service to the Presidency, 

the John H. Chafee Coastal Stewardship Award, the 

Julius A. Stratton Award for Coastal Leadership, and the Distinguished 

Public Service Medal from the Center for the Study 

of the Presidency. 

He earned a B.A. magna cum laude from Santa Clara 

University in 1960, and in 1963 received his J.D. from Santa 

Clara University Law School, where he was an editor of the 

Santa Clara Law Review. He served as a first lieutenant in the 

Army from 1964 to 1966 and received the Army Commendation 

Medal. Panetta is married to the former Sylvia Marie 

Varni. They have three grown sons and five grandchildren. 

136 

The Iraq Study Group





William J. Perry—Member 

William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor 

at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman 

Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School 

of Engineering. He is a senior fellow at FSI and serves as co-director 

of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration 

of Stanford and Harvard universities. 

Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense of the United 

States, serving from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously 

served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1993–94) and as 

Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 

(1977–81). He is on the board of directors of several emerging 

high-tech companies and is Chairman of Global Technology 

Partners. 

His previous business experience includes serving as a 

laboratory director for General Telephone and Electronics 

(1954–64) and as founder and president of ESL Inc. (1964–77), 

executive vice president of Hambrecht & Quist Inc. (1981–85), 

and founder and chairman of Technology Strategies & Alliances 

(1985–93). He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering 

and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the 

Army Corps of Engineers, and served in the Army of Occupation 

in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 

1948 and was a second lieutenant in the Army Reserves from 

1950 to 1955. He has received a number of awards, including 

the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), the Department of 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), and 

Outstanding Civilian Service Medals from the Army (1962 and 

137 

The Iraq Study Group





1997), the Air Force (1997), the Navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence 

Agency (1977 and 1997), NASA (1981), and the 

Coast Guard (1997). He received the American Electronic Association’s 

Medal of Achievement (1980), the Eisenhower 

Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal Medal 

(1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National 

Academy of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche 

Medal in 1996. He has received awards from the enlisted personnel 

of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. 

He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, 

Bahrain, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, 

Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. He received 

a B.S. and M.S. from Stanford University and a Ph.D. 

from Penn State, all in mathematics. 

Charles S. Robb—Member 

Charles S. Robb joined the faculty of George Mason University 

as a Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy in 2001. 

Previously he served as Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, from 

1978 to 1982; as Virginia’s 64th Governor, from 1982 to 1986; 

and as a United States Senator, from 1989 to 2001. 

While in the Senate he became the only member ever to 

serve simultaneously on all three national security committees 

(Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations). He also 

served on the Finance, Commerce, and Budget committees. 

Before becoming a member of Congress he chaired the 

Southern Governors’ Association, the Democratic Governors’ 

Association, the Education Commission of the States, the Democratic 

Leadership Council, Jobs for America’s Graduates, 

the National Conference of Lieutenant Governors, and the Vir- 

138 

The Iraq Study Group





ginia Forum on Education, and was President of the Council of 

State Governments. 

During the 1960s he served on active duty with the United 

States Marine Corps, retiring from the Marine Corps Reserve in 

1991. He began as the Class Honor Graduate from Marine Offi- 

cers Basic School in 1961 and ended up as head of the principal 

recruiting program for Marine officers in 1970. In between, he 

served in both the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions and his assignments 

included duty as a Military Social Aide at the White House 

and command of an infantry company in combat in Vietnam. 

He received his law degree from the University of Virginia 

in 1973, clerked for Judge John D. Butzner, Jr., on the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and practiced law 

with Williams and Connolly prior to his election to state office. 

Between his state and federal service he was a partner at 

Hunton and Williams. 

Since leaving the Senate in 2001 he has served as Chairman 

of the Board of Visitors at the United States Naval Academy, 

Co-Chairman (with Senior Judge Laurence Silberman of 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit) of the President’s 

Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Co-Chairman 

(with former Governor Linwood Holton) of a major landowner’s 

alliance that created a special tax district to finance the extension 

of Metrorail to Tyson’s Corner, Reston, and Dulles Airport. He 

has also been a Fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard and 

at the Marshall Wythe School of Law at William and Mary. 

He is currently on the President’s Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board, the Secretary of State’s International Security 

Advisory Board (Chairman of the WMD-Terrorism Task Force), 

the FBI Director’s Advisory Board, the National Intelligence 

139 

The Iraq Study Group





Council’s Strategic Analysis Advisory Board, the Iraq Study Group, 

and the MITRE Corp. Board of Trustees (Vice Chairman). He 

also serves on the boards of the Space Foundation, the Thomas 

Jefferson Program in Public Policy, the Concord Coalition, the 

National Museum of Americans at War, Strategic Partnerships 

LLC, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency—and he 

works on occasional projects with the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. He is married to Lynda Johnson Robb and 

they have three grown daughters and one granddaughter. 

Alan K. Simpson—Member 

Alan K. Simpson served from 1979 to 1997 as a United States 

Senator from Wyoming. Following his first term in the Senate, 

Al was elected by his peers to the position of the Assistant Majority 

Leader in 1984—and served in that capacity until 1994. 

He completed his final term on January 3, 1997. 

Simpson is currently a partner in the Cody firm of Simpson, 

Kepler and Edwards, the Cody division of the Denver firm 

of Burg Simpson Eldredge, Hersh and Jardine, and also a consultant 

in the Washington, D.C., government relations firm 

The Tongour, Simpson, Holsclaw Group. He continues to serve 

on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards and travels the 

country giving speeches. His book published by William Morrow 

Company, Right in the Old Gazoo: A Lifetime of Scrapping 

with the Press (1997), chronicles his personal experiences and 

views of the Fourth Estate. 

From January of 1997 until June of 2000, Simpson was a 

Visiting Lecturer and for two years the Director of the Institute 

of Politics at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of 

Government. During the fall of 2000 he returned to his alma 

mater, the University of Wyoming, as a Visiting Lecturer in the 

140 

The Iraq Study Group





Political Science Department and he continues to team teach a 

class part-time with his brother, Peter, titled “Wyoming’s Political 

Identity: Its History and Its Politics,” which is proving to be 

one of the most popular classes offered at UW. 

A member of a political family—his father served both as 

Governor of Wyoming from 1954 to 1958 and as United States 

Senator from Wyoming from 1962 to 1966—Al chose to follow 

in his father’s footsteps and began his own political career in 

1964 when he was elected to the Wyoming State Legislature as 

a state representative of his native Park County. He served for 

the next thirteen years in the Wyoming House of Representatives, 

holding the offices of Majority Whip, Majority Floor 

Leader, and Speaker Pro-Tem. His only brother, Peter, also 

served as a member of the Wyoming State Legislature. 

Prior to entering politics, Simpson was admitted to the 

Wyoming bar and the United States District Court in 1958 and 

served for a short time as a Wyoming assistant attorney general. 

Simpson then joined his father, Milward L. Simpson, and later 

Charles G. Kepler in the law firm of Simpson, Kepler and 

Simpson in his hometown of Cody. He would practice law 

there for the next eighteen years. During that time, Simpson 

was very active in all civic, community, and state activities. He 

also served ten years as City Attorney. 

Simpson earned a B.S. in law from the University of 

Wyoming in 1954. Upon graduation from college, he joined the 

Army, serving overseas in the 5th Infantry Division and in the 

2nd Armored Division in the final months of the Army of Occupation 

in Germany. Following his honorable discharge in 1956, 

Simpson returned to the University of Wyoming to complete 

his study of law, earning his J.D. degree in 1958. He and his 

wife Ann have three children and six grandchildren, who all reside 

in Cody, Wyoming. 

141 

The Iraq Study Group





Iraq Study Group Support 

Edward P. Djerejian 

Senior Advisor to the Study Group 

Christopher A. Kojm 

Senior Advisor to the Study Group 

John B. Williams Benjamin J. Rhodes 

Special Assistant to the Study Group Special Assistant to the Study Group 

United States Institute of Peace Support 

Daniel P. Serwer 

ISG Executive Director and Political Development Secretariat 

Paul Hughes 

Military and Security Secretariat 

Gary Matthews 

Economy and Reconstruction Secretariat 

Paul Stares 

Strategic Environment Secretariat 

Courtney Rusin 

Assistant to the Study Group 

Anne Hingeley 

Congressional Relations 

Ian Larsen 

Outreach and Communications 

Center for the Study of the Presidency Support 

Jay M. Parker 

Advisor 

Ysbrant A. Marcelis 

Advisor 

Center for Strategic & International Studies Support 

Kay King 

Advisor 

142